Street Capitalist: Event Driven Value Investments

Unfortunately, the Bank Analyst must remain anonymous. I will say that he works at a large buy-side fund and comes from a value investing background. I think that this interview went really well and you’ll enjoy it. The interview just has a ton of concentrated information about how to look at banks and then perspectives on the sector. I transcribed this from a recording of our conversation, so I everything below is pretty close to word-for-word what was said. I tried to get all questions that were submitted to me answered. Questions and my comments are in bold.

How do you gain a circle of competence with banks? Where do you start?

Keep it very simple. Banks or financial institutions are based around borrowing money and then lending it. So that’s going to be masked by all different types of weird funding mechanisms and odd assets (securities and lending structures). The accounting treatment and regulation will be tricky.

The learning curve especially with the crisis means it’s hard and always evolving. With that giant pot of knowledge you want to keep it very simple. Start out be looking at small micro banks, there are banks trading that might only have 10 branches that operate out of one geography. You can learn that one particular geography and all the macro idiosyncrasies of it. Plus, you can probably talk to management. Keep it simple, find banks that focus on just mortgage lending or commercial and industrial (C&I) lending and master that. Then if you master it you can branch out. If you master mortgages you can branch out to commercial real estate (CRE), then C&I.

Then you could do something like read a Bank of America 10K. They own every type of business within financials. So it might look confusing as a whole but if you think about it individually they are like separate monolines that are operating as a whole.

But yeah definitely start with the simpler banks at first.

What ratios are you looking at the most when examining banks? Do you use the Texas ratio at all given how it has helped signal banks that will need to raise cash in the past?

We don’t really use the Texas ratio specifically. The general ratios that the banks provide you are ok but obviously you can’t just go off of that. There’s much more investigative work. It all starts with a detailed look of the loan/securities portfolios, so type of loans and where they were originated in terms of geography. We look at the different delinquency buckets, non-performing assets, charge-off numbers and make assumptions. It’s a very macro-economic driven process.

Non-Performing Asset (NPA) ratios and charge-off ratios and the rates of their change are important but ultimately it’s the capital relative to the banks assets that’s most important. If a bank has a 4% capital ratio (TCE / TA) and the bank has 5% losses the equity is wiped out assuming they don’t earn their way out. Texas Ratio basically says if all non-performers lead to charge-offs then what percentage of tangible equity would be wiped out, so sort of the same thing.

Do you use any different metrics for regional banks?

No. I wouldn’t say we use any different metrics. Regional banks may not have as many loan categories as the bigger guys. There can be less to look at and obviously its specific to the region. If there is a large discrepancy between the general macro and the regions macro it can make a major difference (meaning a Florida bank may relatively underperform a bank in NJ)

Thomas Brown of Bankstocks argued that the charge-offs to loan reserve ratio had no meaning due to variations in accounting treatment. Can the analyst describe a better criteria for measuring loan reserve adequacy?

There’s some merit to his argument. I’ll give you a simple example: When a bank makes a credit card loan, the reserve to the loan should be higher in theory because it’s an unsecured loan. If it’s a mortgage you can afford to charge off less because there’s collateral backing it up and you’ll have some of the loan recovered in a sale. Obviously the severity is dependent on the economy (if home prices go down). Generally simple reserve ratios may not tell the whole story but when they are headed in one direction quarter after quarter it’s telling you something. If I recall correctly from the specific article where Brown discusses the topic he talks about FHN and how based on reserve ratio, reserves look inadequate but if you look at how those reserves are allocated it seems sufficient. Now you can try to be a hero and pick names that way and claim its thorough analysis but it doesn’t work so well in a banking crisis environment similar to the one we went through.

So should capital adequacy ratios factor in black swan events then?

See – no one knows what that correct capital adequacy ratio (CAR) number is. You don’t know what the severity of the next crisis will be. I’m in favor of keeping the reserve requirements higher than they have historically been. One of the reasons we got in trouble is because the system got way too levered.

How important do you view the funding of deposits? How do you incorporate sources of funding into your investing decisions?

Some people value banks based on deposits — I don’t. I don’t think anyone uses it as the end all valuation. Deposits can make or break a bank. They generally tend to be the stickiest and lowest cost source of funding. With wholesale funding, you’re waking up in the morning praying that some institution is going to keep lending to you. With deposits, you don’t have to worry about that as much.

You want growth in savings loans versus high yield CDs right?

Yeah — the type of deposits is important. If a bank sets them up with hot money CDs, it’s really no different than wholesale funding. GMAC did this. You don’t want a banking institution that does that. You want a depository that people trust and are willing to give you money interest free.

How do you value a bank? Most traditional investors look at things like DCF valuations or try to come up with a Ben Graham style assets-based valuation, but banks are different right?

It’s rare to see a bank analyst use a DCF. We mostly use an earnings model. We then attach a multiple, so what a lot of analysts are doing is attaching the historical 10-12x multiple to normalized earnings.

A simple way of getting an earnings number is by taking a ROA (Return on Assets) percentage and assuming some type of asset growth (negative or positive) and then multiplying the ROA times assets times the growth number. Then, take that number and divide it up by the shares outstanding to get some kind of an EPS figure.

A more detailed model assumes some earnings asset level and net interest margin (NIM) to get net interest income. To get non-interest income you just assume some growth rate off of the fee line items. Then, assuming something on provisions and expenses to get a net income figure. Thats the basic idea and it incorporates a lot of assumptions on the macro and regulatory environment.

During this crisis I think people looked at banks in this manner:

There is a credit/capital concern > people start looking at banks based on tangible book > the concern becomes whether capital is enough. You make your own stress test. If banks pass that you might want to invest in them. Obviously you have to net that against how ouch they will earn too. But trying to earn your way out didn’t really work for Japan.

Ulimately, normalized earnings will depend on GDP and unemployment. If it ends up being robust (so GDP growth rates are high and the unemployment rate goes down) then banks will win but the biggest risk to bank earnings going forward is the level of earning assets. If earning assets decline, normalized earnings will not be as high. The decline in loan balances is something I’m paying particularly close attention to this quarter.

So if a bank has 14% capital and they currently have losses of 3% you are probably in good shape assuming they are not lying or pushing losses into the future. But a bank of that sort might not be cheap either, which can make it a waste to invest in.

What kinds of things do you usually ask management on calls and visits?

Ask whatever you can’t get out of the 10Q and 10K. Understand the intricacies of the business. Find out about specific accounting treatments and things like granular details on their loan portfolios.

Also, trying to gauge how they see the macro-economic environment. The best thing to ask management is to ask what they see in their locale. Look at Case Schiller and see what a specific housing market is doing and then ask a bank there about it. They might say that even if house prices are going up, the unemployment situation still sucks so there’s no improvement.

In Margin of Safety, Seth Klarman says that value investors don’t invest in banks often because their asset books are too opaque. How, when you’re analyzing a bank, do you make sure the assets have a credible margin of safety?

It depends on a lot of factors. 1. The types of loans and geography 2. How loans are performing. 3. Management’s track record in originating loans and honesty. 4. How the macro is performing and 5. How aggressive/conservative management is in working through problem loans.

So dealing with the transparency, that’s a good question. Investing in financials is more of a gamble than any other category. You will simply not have the transparency you have at other simpler businesses. In other sectors management on conference calls can give you line item guidance that you can just plug in your models to come out with next quarter EPS within a small range of error. How many financial management teams got it wrong or thought they wouldn’t be the last one’s holding the bag during the crisis? I remember hearing Ken Lewis (CEO of Bank of America) talking about how the recession will end in 2Q08. And this guy basically gets a real time update on the economy on a daily basis.

So you want a wider margin of safety. If you would buy a company at 6x P/E, you might want to aim for 4x P/E.

Financials are truly a different animal in my opinion. There is no advantage in investing in financials (meaning you are not getting superior moats or higher ROE businesses compared to other sectors) If you thought the market was dead cheap in march for example, there were plenty of businesses in plain vanilla sectors (retail) that had rises greater than or similar to financials and were much easier to understand. Assuming these stocks were undervalued and haven’t gone up for speculative purposes, you can see that car rental company Avis Budget Group (NYSE:CAR) is up 11 fold since its low compared to Bank of America which is up 6x. I would say Avis is a lot easier to understand than BoA.

So why did value investors get it wrong?

As a value investor, investing in a financial requires really getting comfortable with the macro-economic situation. So unless you’re doing some kind of arbitrage (market-neutral) play, you will have to look at the macro. If you want to ignore the macro because Warren Buffett says it is useless then you want to stay away, especially if you’re not benchmarked or don’t have a mandate to invest in financials.

I think that some value investors refused to believe that this time it is different. Also, they just didn’t understand the risks involved with some of the intricacies in financials. Bruce Berkowtiz talks about how he didn’t understand AIG when he read about their derivatives and said pass.

I think that other value investors, especially the ones who decided that AIG was cheap let those risks pass by them. Or they looked at history and said “Okay, this bank trades at 1/2 book and based on history its never been cheaper.” They were wrong.

What would happen to banks in a hyper-inflationary scenario in which the 30-year Treasury yield goes to 15-20% or higher, as Julian Robertson has suggested?

In a hyper or super high rate environment, it will not be good for financials and equities.

The first step would be that asset sensitive banks where loans/securities re-price faster than their liabilities would win temporarily. If you read what SCHW has said, for every 100 bps rise in rates they generate 600 million in net revenues, which pretty much fall straight to the bottom line.

Eventually the dynamic that would kick in would be that depositors would demand higher rates. If rates are 15% depositors wont want 3% CDs. So right there, funding costs would go up.

For a bank to make money, it’s usually an 80/20 split. So, 80% comes from interest income and 20% from fees. Since banks typically generate income from net interest income, they’re going to have to make loans that are higher than their funding costs. The argument is, what homeowner wants to pay a 15% mortgage in a 10% unemployment environment? Credit card rates have already gone up — you’ve seen Wells Fargo and others already do this to try to protect against potential regulatory changes, so that they can keep ROEs closer to a historical level.

I’d argue though that loan demand would collapse. Unless it’s a necessity but I don’t think anybody can raise prices high enough to match that kind of rate environment. Would you pay $20 for a Starbucks coffee? I don’t think so.

So the basic idea here is that nobody will be able to afford those loans and the demand for credit will fall?

So yeah, when funding costs become elevated it’s tough for them to make loans higher than the funding cost. A coffee shop isn’t going to take a loan to buy an espresso maker when the rate is 15%. To make money above their 15% cost you would have to raise prices to the point where no one would purchase a latte. Will that espresso machine make a 15% return to make that a viable expense? I doubt it. Initially, when rates start to rise, asset sensitive banks will win.

So let’s say a bank out there has locked in 5% funding base for the next 10 years. If rates go to 20%, they’re safe with their 5% and they’ll be able to price loans above that easily. Or a bank can become the lender to the government, but if all you’re doing is funding the government that wont work in the long term, as the economy would collapse.

The trade in financials has largely been long large money center and short regional banks. Do you see that trend continuing going forward?

If you start from the beginning, that trade has worked relatively. The best trade was to just long the whole sector. Now I would say that trade is worth holding onto. Ultimately, what I see on the long side is truly diminishing. On the short side there is some stuff but its primarily valuation related.

I want to make clear though that the idea to go long money center banks has had the margin of safety diminish by a lot. I’ll give an example:

Smart and dumb analysts think that Bank of America (NYSE:BAC) is going to earn around $2.50 to $3.00 in 2011 or 2012. What happens if they’re dead wrong? What happens if they earn $0.90 cents? Then you are clearly overpaying for the price it is at today, $17. But when the stock was available at about $3 it was either trading at 3x or 1x. It was very cheap at both of those multiples.

It’s scary because everyone is betting on Bank of America and I don’t like to bet on a horse that everyone else is betting on. If there is a chain reaction of sells on that name it can contract quite a bit.

How worried are you about regionals with large commercial real estate (CRE) exposure as we progress through what seems to be the next set of fundamental problems? And on that note, which regionals would you be most afraid of here?

In the beginning of the year people thought about banks specifically on the basis of what are the banks with early credit stage issues – housing, consumer type loans (credit cards) versus banks with later stage issues like CRE.

So for example: If you see people moving onto land, they’ll build houses. And if companies see houses, they’ll build commercial real estate and expand their businesses there. So in theory, it’s consumer loans that go bad and then goes CRE and C&I. So for regionals, later stage issues are a larger portion of their loan portfolios. We haven’t seen that hit as much as the early stage credit stuff.

CRE is an interesting animal. 1. There’s a lot of weird accounting 2. The structure of the loan itself. So there are these mini-perm loans for example where on the third or fifth year, the principle balance of the loan is due. A lot of these loans were made between 2005-2007. You still have 2009-2011 where things will come due. But a lot of these mini perm loans get extended out a year. So instead of going to non-performing they just get extended out and to all of us we continue to think they are performing.

Fifth Third (NASDAQ:FITB) is one regional that I’m kind of worried about. In general, right, if you’re going to look for CRE issues there’s a few categories: retail, lodging, industrial, and multi-family. Multi-family probably won’t do as bad as other ones because it’s harder to get loans to buy a mortgage. So more people are going to move into apartments in theory but it will still be hit. That might not do as bad as the other types of loans. Retail will obviously take a hit with consumer spending dropping and unemployment levels elevated. Here are some numbers: a basket of regionals – CMA 22.4%, MTB 25%, Regions 21%, Synovus 28%, Zion 35%. If you look at Wells Fargo 10%. Citigroup it is 2% and for BoA it’s 5.75% of loan portfolio. So those guys are pretty diversified versus the regionals that have a ton of CRE exposure. So you have to drill down and figure out the type of CRE they have the geography of it.

So basically it’s a way for management to hide delinquencies using weird accounting treatments?

Exactly. I’d point to the FDIC bank failures. A lot of the failed banks had 2-4% delinquencies in CRE and then a quarter later delinquencies shot up to 30%!. So you don’t really see that in other categories as the increase is gradual Q/Q.

Will majors participate in open market M&A or wait for the FDIC gain deposit share?

A lot of consolidation you saw with PNC (NYSE:PNC) taking over Nat City, Wells taking over Wachovia, I would argue that that type of M&A is less likely in the near term. More of the FDIC bank seizure type will be common

What about straight up mergers/takeovers?

Banks are still worrying about filling holes in their capital base. Even though equity markets have opened up, these guys would likely have to raise money to take over a large-scale bank. Look at Wells Fargo. Once they put on all their off-balance sheet exposure they’ll have a TCE ratio closer to 3%. They’re already in the 4%-ish range. Some of these guys are already too big — a single bank cannot own 10% of the depositor base of the US. You can only do that if you grow the deposit base organically. Not through takeovers, though I think that rule wasn’t considered last year

Can you talk about how you think regulatory / compliance changes that are on the horizon will affect banks? Any key things to watch out for?

One thing that’s known by the industry that everyone is expecting is rules on new capital adequacy ratios. Capital ratios will go up, the system cannot lever as much as it did before. That’s one thing. Fees are going to get hit (think deposit fees, credit card fees). Who knows what will happen if the Consumer Protection Agency goes forward.

I think normalized earnings will go down because of this. I think provisioning rules will change too. When times are good, banks can’t build reserves too high. FASB will argue that that they’re trying to dodge taxes. Do you know how that works?

No I don’t — let’s go into that a bit.

Okay so, when you have to build your allowances for loan losses, it comes through the provision expense. So banks have a reserve set aside, Bank A has $1000 in reserves with $100 in charge-offs. $100 comes out and the reserve is $900 now. If you want to replenish you need to add $100 but if you want to over provide for that you need to add $101 or more, which all comes out of net income.

In good times, some banks might want to provide for more if they think a crisis is coming. The less they provide the higher their earnings will be. The more they earn, the more they pay in taxes. FASB doesn’t want them to build reserves to an amount they think is unnecessary.

It goes back to what Japan was worried about. Their loans stayed in trouble for a long time. I think 25% of Japan’s tax receipts came from financial reserves. So the government didn’t want them to provide for bad loans.

So yeah — it would severely dent tax revenues. So that’s the dynamic here, there’s this quirk in the accounting and regulatory situation.

Exactly. If a bank had foreseen the crisis, they would have had pressure to actually lower reserves. So I think that will change for the better now and that banks will be able build reserves at a higher rate than before.

How do you deal with the government interference and its skewing of natural competition among banks? (i.e.: having the entire mortgage market in 3-4 banks)

Yeah, so there’s always a stigma with government. I think that’s why banks got so depressed in January and March lows. There were a lot of nationalization fears and the stress test looming. Nat City always boggles me because they had 8.7% TCE ratio, they were one of the highest among peers/large banks. For some reason that bank had to basically be sold to PNC. It could have been a depositor’s run.

So you think the government overreacted in cases?

I don’t think government is good at running businesses. So if they start telling banks whom to originate to I wouldn’t want to be a shareholder of that bank. I do think it will have some implications on the lending business going forward.

One thing to add to that, some people are definitely giving the banks that have excessive intervention less of a multiple. Bank X might be worth 8x but Bank Y that paid back TARP might be worth 10x.

Do you agree with that?

Yeah I do. If government flexing their muscles influences operations, if it becomes very big, then yeah. I don’t think government will be as efficient although I don’t think management of banks themselves aren’t so competent or efficient.

Yeah I thought it was interesting that Citigroup had to sell Phibro, even though it’s a profitable and well-run business unit.

Yeah that’s one decent example. Another thing — if you have more programs or initiatives that relax loan standards. If you can’t pay 20% down you shouldn’t buy a house, no matter what the American dream entails. America’s sort of becoming one big bank. They’re doing subprime lending with the FHAs.

What’s your best long and short for the sector? Themes?

I currently ask two questions:
1. What financial institutions are pushing problems to the future?
2. What banks are trying to work through their issues right now and be prepared for an uncertain world?

So how do you tell that?

Find banks that are aggressive in marking down their books and aggressive in raising capital. Or banks that didn’t partake in this excess during the credit bubble. You’ll find these banks; they might not be very popular. Look for well-capitalized institutions that are ready to pick off credits from weaker institutions. It’s sad to say but look for well-connected management. Look at Goldman Sachs (NYSE:GS), a lot of people complain about Goldman, like with that Rolling Stones article. But if you think about it, all those negatives are reasons I’d want to own them at the right price.

So for management, look for guys that are liked by politicians and the public?

So if Warren Buffett were to fall tomorrow, a bunch of guys would be saying all these great things about the life he lived. Angelo Mozilo of Countrywide? Probably not so much. In banking, honesty is super important. It’s important everywhere but I mean — look at IndyMac’s CEO. He was so positive up till the bank collapsed. It’s very unfair and really tough. Some investors really relied on his word and it’s very sad. The good thing about having this period in history is that you can see what management teams handled it well. So if the problems get worse, you can use this period to see if they passed.

I would argue that future crises that come about are likely to be worse. With the way the US is acting these days, with the amount of debt they’re taking on, we’ll probably see more problems in the future.

Commerce Bancorp (formerly CBH) used to be a unique bank that had a different business model. If it were a standalone company now, would it have been affected the same way as most of the big banks? Also, would it have taken more market share from the likes of BoA and Citi.

The thing is, when you go through a system-wide crisis, even small banks are bound to be affected. People always praise Wells but I highly doubt that they picked off the best credits in California while Countrywide and IndyMac were left holding the crap. When you have that big of a loan portfolio, I doubt that whole number is good credits. Obviously it hasn’t been.

So Commerce, their model, Vernon Hill was definitely an innovator. Bank Atlantic tried to mimic it exactly, UMPQ is doing something similar. Ultimately though, it’s the type of loans you make that can bring you down. You can be the most innovative banker in the world but if you make bad loans you’ll go down. Commerce also benefited from having a geographic concentration in the Tri-state area.

Are there any banks in particular that stand out in doing new, innovative things? The future of banking will be different than it is today, which banks are going to be ready for that new future?

I’m sure people can disagree but I’d argue how innovative can you really get in a borrowing/lending model. The medium is changing. We’re seeing more Internet banking and maybe something happens in mobile. When is the last time you actually stepped into a bank branch? My parents do, but not so much the younger generations. There’s banks that offer iPhone apps, so that’s the type of innovation I see but nothing too big. You wont get credit for innovation when you’re in a banking crisis.

Mostly, innovations are used to get cheap deposits. If there is a bank that can innovate and do it correctly, then it can work well. Commerce is a great example of one that did achieve it. Their efficiency ratio was higher than most peers but that’s because they kept their bank open 7 days a week and they made it so you really wanted to visit their branches. They used nice colors, had super friendly tellers (they weren’t stuck behind bullet proof windows or a mini gate), and they didn’t make branches look like a post office or a jail cell.

Their whole idea was putting more money towards non-interest expense but they were able to charge less for deposits since they were more convenient. It definitely worked. If you could invest in safe assets you could earn a wider NIM than peers.

The thing about Vernon Hill was that he wasn’t in the banking business forever, he owned Burger King franchises so he brought over that customer-driven model to banking. But if you run into the storm like we did now, innovation is not a high priority on bank executives’ minds.

If you look at innovation from other areas, like tech, you’ll see guys in college who are really bright that are making websites trying to innovative banks.

Yeah I wanted to talk about that — I always see guys, especially from valley tech startups saying how we need to take the start up model to banking ad really innovate things on that end. Every time, I think this is a recipe for failure with all the regulatory hurdles and work involved.

That’s another good point. It’s a heavily regulated industry. So for someone in college or high school that has a bright idea for starting something in the financial sector, they’re going to go through more capital and regulatory barriers than someone trying to build something like Facebook or Twitter. The roadblocks are just a lot higher.

A lot of times when there’s innovation in financials, it usually comes from within the banking system itself. So it is some guy who has been there for 10 years who sees something and acts on it. But it’s almost never from guys on the outside that think of something one day while sitting in their college classroom.

I would argue that there’s simply a smaller number of brains devoted to thinking about new ideas in banking and it’s mostly limited to people who are already in the financial world because it is within their competence.

What about innovative companies within banking?

There’s definitely people like Dick Kovacevich of Wells Fargo who talks about cross selling at Wells Fargo. There are people who argue that it doesn’t work but to him it’s like the Holy Grail. I’d argue to some degree it has worked because Wells Fargo probably has the best funding out there. I don’t have much experience with their branches since I’m on the east coast but we’ll see how things go with this Wachovia integration.

One thing that a lot of value guys got wrong is that they focus too much on qualitative factors like culture and things on the surface of the business model too much. They focus so much on the positives that they aren’t looking at the risks looming. When you’re sitting there analyzing tech companies, a lot of tech companies have good balance sheets. You’re not trained to look at balance sheet risk. David Einhorn did better on financials than other guys, because they set themselves up to look more at downside. Tom Brown focused too much on culture / qualitative factors and didn’t consider the macro/quantitative reasons that could destroy a bank.

What are you reading right now?

I’m reading Just What I Said by Carrol Baum, a Bloomberg Economics columnist. It’s pretty basic. One thing I learned about banks is that macro matters so much more than you think with banks. You’re almost a macro investor, so on that note I’m also reading Alchemy of Finance by George Soros.

One more basic/beginners book that I really like is Peter Lynch’s One Up Wall Street, that was a book that had a big impact on how I looked at investing when I was younger.

Thank you very much for giving your time for this interview. I know that my readers are going to enjoy it.

Yesterday I posted, asking for any input on what to ask Michael Lewis at his talk that was given to my school today. Nobody had suggestions, so I just asked something I was genuinely curious about as a blogger. Below are answers to questions regarding football, finance, and his next book.

The talk focused mainly on his book The Blind Side because it is required reading for one of the freshmen introductory courses here — so really, the talk mainly focused on that. I would have liked it if some of the people asking questions ventured more towards finance, since that is what he has written about recently, but they didn’t. Since I was only the second person asking a question I lacked that hindsight.

Here are some interesting questions though, a mix of sports and finance that I think readers may be interested in. All of the below is paraphrased by me, so don’t take these as exact quotations.

Q: Who will Michael Oher play for? (Michael Oher is the subject of The Blind Side)

A: If I had to bet, the San Francisco 49ers.

Q: What do you think could be improved upon in financial journalism? (My Question)

A: In the scheme of things, financial journalism is not really a big of a problem or some kind of machine that hurts the republic. Print journalism is largely fine. There is this backlash right now that’s asking where the journalists were during this crisis. The fact is, they were there, they were commenting on some of these issues — but people refused to listen (My guess is that this is a hint towards his book Panic, which if I understand correctly features articles that were written from the crisis’ inception and through out it).

I think that CNBC though, is bad. It breeds a kind of hysteria which is not healthy, especially for investors. But this problem really is not limited to CNBC, you saw it with political reporting on TV as well. That’s how TV is. It should be viewed as entertainment. So no, no real need for any big improvement in financial journalism.

Q: What do you think of moral hazard and its role in the crisis and finance?

A: Moral Hazard is important,its a really subtle force. I don’t think that a trader at Merrill Lynch was thinking that if he won big he would make a lot of money on a trade and if he loses the government will have to step in and bail them out. This problem though was not limited to banks her, it was every where — global. I think that the ideal risk taking environment is with partnerships. With partnership, the senior partners have much more of a stake in the livelihood of the business and as a result, they would not lever up 30-to-1 and take these exhorbant risks, or really be able to borrow so much.

I think that “too big to fail” is a recipe for failure and these big banks will have to be dismantled in the future. Most of the future big risk taking will probably be moved to partnerships. I think that the current steps the government is taking will lead to some unintended and bad consequences because the problem is likely to be much worse than everyone thinks at the moment. Things may change but everyone will probably forget about this crisis 15 years from now and relax standards, creating yet another problem.

Q: Finding inefficiencies in sports, will it spread?

A: It is really existing everywhere. I’ve spoken to cricket and rugby teams about it. One of the things I think is that the reason it is spreading and taking hold more is the fact that players salaries have skyrocketed. A mistake with a player that costed $50,000 is much less than what’s now — a mistake that would cost the team $50M.

As a result, it becomes much cheaper and more intelligent to hire a couple PhDs from MIT than it is to chance it and stay with the same old broken system. What’s going to happen is a Darwinian process where the teams that don’t take this up will lose games and be forced to move towards it.

Q: Future book on the Houston Rockets?

A: There will be no book on the Houston Rockets. I’m working on a book right now about the financial crisis and a manager who was able to see it and profit from it. Basically it is an extension of the Portfolio article, that was the book pitch. Little work done on the book so far, I probably need another year or so for it.

If you want to know more about what he said regarding The Blind Side, feel free to ask. Like I said, most of the talk was dedicated to this subject, I’ve limited this post mainly to the select questions and answers. He spoke a bit about his writing process and literature, so I can go more in depth into those subjects if any of you wish to know more.

Check out Tunku Varadarajan’s interview with Nouriel Roubini in the WSJ. A few couple quotes:

Mr. Roubini tells me that bank nationalization “is something the partisans would have regarded as anathema a few weeks ago. But when I and others put it in the context of the Swedish approach [of the 1990s] — i.e. you take banks over, you clean them up, and you sell them in rapid order to the private sector — it’s clear that it’s temporary. No one’s in favor of a permanent government takeover of the financial system.”

There’s another reason why the concept should appeal to (fiscal) conservatives, he explains. “The idea that government will fork out trillions of dollars to try to rescue financial institutions, and throw more money after bad dollars, is not appealing because then the fiscal cost is much larger. So rather than being seen as something Bolshevik, nationalization is seen as pragmatic. Paradoxically, the proposal is more market-friendly than the alternative of zombie banks.”

One of the things I encounter with conservatives is the utter disgust for anything that sounds like nationalization. But I think that until the bad assets are flushed out, we’re going to keep seeing financial bloodbaths like what happened on friday. Nationalization may be the only way to bring about the kind of confidence that you need for banks to regain their strength.

I know that some investors have crept into financial institutions over the last quarter, by building stakes in companies like GE and Wells Fargo (both of which hit multi-year lows on friday), but I hesitate. For me, I’ve always preferred non-financial businesses in the sense that if they end up failing, they can liquidate and you’ll extract some kind of value. With financials, it’s much trickier. If this panic keeps up, you might see runs on banks and when deposits flee any of these behemoths can be quickly cut down.

Nationalization at the very least could take the banks away from Mr. Market’s glaring eyes and give management there some time to really make proactive changes without having to worry about their daily stock price. These decisions would be made for creating and preserving value, rather than defending the company from whatever psychological assaults that the market throws at them.

In reading about the Swedish model, the one thing I’ve noticed is that the government there still has somewhat of a controlling stake in their formerly nationalized banks. But over all, the effect of such action was quite positive. Here though I think we’d see a lot of investors who would love to jump into any of these financial institutions after they’ve been stripped of the bad assets so the government stake would likely be sold off after a short period of time.

Roubini brings up another worry though:

…Yet another reason why bank nationalization is a good idea, Mr. Roubini continues, is that “we started with banks that were too big to fail, but what has happened, in the process, is that these banks have become even-bigger-to-fail. J.P. Morgan took over Bear Stearns and WaMu. BofA took over Countrywide and then Merrill. Wells Fargo took over Wachovia. It doesn’t work! You can’t take two zombie banks, put them together, and make a strong bank. It’s like having two drunks trying to keep each other standing.

“So if you took over a big bank, and you split the assets in three or four pieces, maybe you create three or four regional or national banks, and they’re stronger! Nationalization — or ‘temporary receivership,’ if you like, if the N-word is a political liability — is an occasion to undo the sort of consolidation that has created an even bigger systemic problem. And the only way to do it is by essentially taking them over and breaking them up.”

If you think about it, he’s correct. Our policy at the start of the crisis was one where the government essentially financed or at least backstopped consolidation transactions. Rather than fix the dreaded “too big to fail banks” we had banks that were even larger come in and swallow them up. This does little else than create a problem for the future. Until these are broken apart, any issue with these banks would impose a huge systemic risk.

One of my biggest questions right now is what kinds of effects government intervention will have on equity holders. The fact is, it’s a little ridiculous for these guys to get a free ride while taxpayer money is guaranteeing their businesses. There needs to be a re-alignment of risks and rewards here, in order to prevent moral hazard from ensuing. The way I could envision it is sort of an application of the stress-testing that everyone seems to be talking about right now. The banks with a greater degree of bad assets will see higher rates of common equity holders wiped out, while the banks with less will see less of a reduction.

My guess is that such a policy will be difficult to implement, but something like it should happen. Until it does, you should expect the roller coaster equity markets to continue.

I’ve only recently been turned on to Howard Marks of Oaktree Capital, but so far I like a lot of what he says. You can find his latest memo The Long View here. Today’s NYTimes features an article about the inclusion of private capital allocators in Geithner’s bailout plan:

Mr. Marks is a former banker who became a pioneer in the graveyard of Wall Street. He is one of the biggest players in distressed investing — putting money into risky investments that few others will touch.

But he and other potential investors are wary of the risk in this case.

With its plan to shore up banks that was announced on Tuesday, the Obama administration hopes to entice investors like Mr. Marks, who has $55 billion at his command, to buy troubled assets from the nation’s banks and enable them to make the loans needed to jump-start the economy…

But Mr. Marks and other investors like him said they were in no hurry to wade into this mess. Distressed investors — “vultures” is the Wall Street term for them — aim to buy investments on the cheap in hopes of reaping big returns.

Yet even for the vultures, the risks — political as well as financial — seem daunting. Some worry about being seen as profiteers who benefit at taxpayers’ expense, even though the economy could get worse unless they swoop in.

“You have to ask whether this is an attractive deal,” said Mr. Marks, the chairman of Oaktree Capital Management, a big money management firm in Los Angeles. It all depends on the price, the terms and the risks, he said. Wall Street, of course, wants what it always wants: a lot of potential profit on the upside, and not much risk of losses on the downside. But as Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner outlined his sweeping rescue plan on Tuesday, the questions kept piling up.

What kind of assets would the banks sell, and at what price? What role would the government play? And, of course, the big one: what are these investments really worth? The banks themselves are struggling to place values on them.

Washington Hopes ‘Vulture’ Investors Will Buy Bad Assets (NYTimes)

I think the main sticking point of the plan has to do with the pricing of assets. Geithner’s terse presentation yesterday did little to remedy that aspect and we saw markets fall. This makes me think that maybe they still haven’t figured out how to do it, and until they do there will be some hesitancy by private market participants. Michael J. de la Merced and Zachery Kouwe do bring up the IndyMac plan, where the government basically offered to step in and take on losses after a 20% decline.

While this plan may appear good on paper, it still poses an issue for institutional fund managers. In order to get paid, these managers need to have positive returns. A loss of 20%, which may seem like only a little, can actually be a lot when you realize that many of these guys were down 30 to 50% for 2008. Losing 20% would only increase that gap and make it more difficult to earn fees.

I’d like to point you all to a recent interview with Marks (LA Business Journal):

Q: You recently sent out a memo called “The Long View” with your thoughts on the turmoil in the financial markets. What do you think was the cause?
A: If you have to single out one thing, (leverage) was probably the greatest part. There’s an old saying in Las Vegas that the more you bet, the more you win when you win. But they always leave out the part about the more you lose when you lose. That’s what leverage is. Leverage does not add value to an investment – it doesn’t make it a better investment; it only magnifies the outcomes.

Q: And the long view?
A: These things never change. It will always be the case that when borrowed money is too easily available and people do not concern themselves with the downside, they will leverage their activities to levels where if something goes wrong they won’t survive. One of my favorite quotes in the world is from John Kenneth Galbraith. He says that one of the outstanding characteristics of financial markets is “the extreme brevity of the financial memory.”

Q: Why did you decide to stay in Los Angeles? Is there a benefit to being away from a financial center like New York?
A: The main reason that I stayed is because this is a great place to live. But we often theorize, especially at times of chaos, that it’s a help to be outside New York because you can see the real outline of things better from the outside than from the inside. New York is so overwhelmingly an investment community that I think it’s easier to have a broad perspective if you’re observing it rather than in the middle of it.

Q: What does it take to excel in investment management?
A: You obviously need to be to some degree numerically facile. You have to have a certain perceptiveness and an ability to look at a picture and see more than the average person sees. It’s so easy to see that the average person will do average. And if a client wanted to do average, they can put their money in an index fund. You just can’t swallow the same story that the average investor swallows and expect to be above average.

Q: Like what?
A: For one example, there’s an article by Charlie Ellis that I think was called “Winning the Loser’s Game.” What I took from that article was the way to succeed in investing – just like the way to succeed at being a B-level tennis player, which I am – is to not make mistakes. The champs win by hitting winners; the B player at a country club wins by not hitting losers. So that resonated with me and that’s one of the things we do. Oaktree’s motto is that if we avoid the losers, the winners take care of themselves.

Pay attention to that last answer, I think it tells us a lot about how to think successfully when looking at opportunities right now. When I discussed Geithner’s new plan, I noted that even a 20% loss may be too much. Marks seems to affirm that with his tennis player analogy, the idea is to dodge losers all together rather than simply limit how much damage the losers can do to your portfolio. I’m also reminded of Warren Buffett’s rule: Rule No.1: Never lose money. Rule No.2: Never forget rule No.1. That’s likely to be the main reason that there’s still a high level of skepticism being offered by investors right now of these new bailout plan. Until more information is released, it’s likely that we’ll continue to be in an environment with shaky confidence and little involvement from private investors.

Yesterday, I read the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation’s annual letter. You can find a link to it here.

In Gates’ letter, he mentions that one of the problems facing the Gates foundation and really all philanthropic organizations is the economy. When times are good, people are usually more likely to give away money. With asset prices falling, the likelihood of that is less. Gates quoted a passage from John Maynard Keynes in his letter, which he said was sent to him by Warren Buffett:

“This is a nightmare, which will pass away with the morning. For the resources of nature and men’s devices are just as fertile and productive as they were. The rate of our progress towards solving the material problems of life is not less rapid. We are as capable as before of affording for everyone a high standard of life—high, I mean, compared with, say, twenty years ago—and will soon learn to afford a standard higher still. We were not previously deceived. But today we have involved ourselves in a colossal muddle, having blundered in the control of a delicate machine, the working of which we do not understand. The result is that our possibilities of wealth may run to waste for a time—perhaps for a long time.”

THE GREAT SLUMP OF 1930 – John Maynard Keynes (Project Gutenberg)

The problem that Keynes saw at the time was one in which the lenders stopped lending and factory owners stopped producing goods because they feared that there would be no one to sell to. The following passage has certain parallels to what we’re experiencing now:

Why is there an insufficient output of new capital-goods in the world as a whole? It is due, in my opinion, to a conjunction of several causes. In the first instance, it was due to the attitude of lenders—for new capital-goods are produced to a large extent with borrowed money. Now it is due to the attitude of borrowers, just as much as to that of lenders.

For several reasons lenders were, and are, asking higher terms for loans, than new enterprise can afford. First, the fact, that enterprise could afford high rates for some time after the war whilst war wastage was being made good, accustomed lenders to expect much higher rates than before the war. Second, the existence of political borrowers to meet Treaty obligations, of banking borrowers to support newly restored gold standards, of speculative borrowers to take part in Stock Exchange booms, and, latterly, of distress borrowers to meet the losses which they have incurred through the fall of prices, all of whom were ready if necessary to pay almost any terms, have hitherto enabled lenders to secure from these various classes of borrowers higher rates than it is possible for genuine new enterprise to support. Third, the unsettled state of the world and national investment habits have restricted the countries in which many lenders are prepared to invest on any reasonable terms at all. A large proportion of the globe is, for one reason or another, distrusted by lenders, so that they exact a premium for risk so great as to strangle new enterprise altogether. For the last two years, two out of the three principal creditor nations of the world, namely, France and the United States, have largely withdrawn their resources from the international market for long-term loans.

Meanwhile, the reluctant attitude of lenders has become matched by a hardly less reluctant attitude on the part of borrowers. For the fall of prices has been disastrous to those who have borrowed, and anyone who has postponed new enterprise has gained by his delay. Moreover, the risks that frighten lenders frighten borrowers too. Finally, in the United States, the vast scale on which new capital enterprise has been undertaken in the last five years has somewhat exhausted for the time being—at any rate so long as the atmosphere of business depression continues—the profitable opportunities for yet further enterprise. By the middle of 1929 new capital undertakings were already on an inadequate scale in the world as a whole, outside the United States. The culminating blow has been the collapse of new investment inside the United States, which to-day is probably 20 to 30 per cent. less than it was in 1928. Thus in certain countries the opportunity for new profitable investment is more limited than it was; whilst in others it is more risky.

A wide gulf, therefore, is set between the ideas of lenders and the ideas of borrowers for the purpose of genuine new capital investment; with the result that the savings of the lenders are being used up in financing business losses and distress borrowers, instead of financing new capital works.

At this moment the slump is probably a little overdone for psychological reasons. A modest upward reaction, therefore, may be due at any time. But there cannot be a real recovery, in my judgment, until the ideas of lenders and the ideas of productive borrowers are brought together again; partly by lenders becoming ready to lend on easier terms and over a wider geographical field, partly by borrowers recovering their good spirits and so becoming readier to borrow.

Seldom in modern history has the gap between the two been so wide and so difficult to bridge. Unless we bend our wills and our intelligences, energized by a conviction that this diagnosis is right, to find a solution along these lines, then, if the diagnosis is right, the slump may pass over into a depression, accompanied by a sagging price-level, which might last for years, with untold damage to the material wealth and to the social stability of every country alike. Only if we seriously seek a solution, will the optimism of my opening sentences be confirmed—at least for the nearer future.

It is beyond the scope of this article to indicate lines of future policy. But no one can take the first step except the central banking authorities of the chief creditor countries; nor can any one Central Bank do enough acting in isolation. Resolute action by the Federal Reserve Banks of the United States, the Bank of France, and the Bank of England might do much more than most people, mistaking symptoms or aggravating circumstances for the disease itself, will readily believe. In every way the more effective remedy would be that the Central Banks of these three great creditor nations should join together in a bold scheme to restore confidence to the international long-term loan market; which would serve to revive enterprise and activity everywhere, and to restore prices and profits, so that in due course the wheels of the world’s commerce would go round again.

Keynes’ solution was that central banks needed to come together and take unified action in order to shore up confidence. Today’s Wall Street Journal had a great article penned by Yale’s Robert Shiller about the difficulties behind rallying confidence:

The term “animal spirits,” popularized by John Maynard Keynes in his 1936 book “The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money,” is related to consumer or business confidence, but it means more than that. It refers also to the sense of trust we have in each other, our sense of fairness in economic dealings, and our sense of the extent of corruption and bad faith. When animal spirits are on ebb, consumers do not want to spend and businesses do not want to make capital expenditures or hire people…

A critical aspect of animal spirits is trust, an emotional state that dismisses doubts about others. In talking about animal spirits, Keynes sought to convey the message that swings in confidence are not always logical. The business cycle is in good part driven by animal spirits. There are good times when people have substantial trust and associated feelings that contribute to an environment of confidence. They make decisions spontaneously. They believe instinctively that they will be successful, and they suspend their suspicions. As long as large groups of people remain trusting, people’s somewhat rash, impulsive decision-making is not discovered.

Unfortunately, we have just passed through a period in which confidence was blind. It was not based on rational evidence. The trust in our mortgage and housing markets that drove real-estate prices to unsustainable heights is one of the most dramatic examples of unbridled animal spirits we have ever seen.

Furthermore, while animal spirits have been high over a very long period of time, a whole new system for the granting of credit had been generated. Some 30 or 40 years ago there was much less intermediation in financial markets. But then along came financial innovation and a new financial system, not just in mortgages and housing but throughout the credit system, with complicated strategies of securitization and use of derivatives. The more complex the transaction the more trust is needed to sustain the transaction.

Shiller offers us a few ways officials could get the animal spirits confidence again:

So what must we do to revive our animal spirits and economic growth? We must be certain that programs to solve the current financial and economic crisis are large enough, and targeted broadly enough, to impact public confidence. Not only do we need a fiscal stimulus significantly greater than the proposal that is currently on the table, government action is also needed to take the place of the credit markets that seemingly worked so well when animal spirits were high. The Treasury and the Federal Reserve not only need a fiscal target, they also need a credit target. This should not be a dollar number, but rather a target for how the credit markets should behave. The goal should be that those who would normally receive credit in times of full employment can once again find it easy to do so, at rates with realistic risk premiums.

There are three ways to restore these credit markets. The Treasury and the Federal Reserve have been inventive in applying all three methods. The first is the extension of rediscounting. The Fed has invented many different special loan facilities. They have even invented ingenious ways to combine Treasury money to make very large-scale loans while still within the legal requirement that the Fed can only lend against safe collateral when using TARP funds for the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility, which will support consumer, student and small-business loans. But so far the total amount of such rediscounting has been small relative to the size of the credit markets. They need to be much larger.

Second, so far more than $250 billion of government money has been used to recapitalize banks. But just making the banks solvent is not enough. The banks, whose managers are suffering from the same flagging animal spirits as the rest of the economy, will not expand their credit much just because they are more solvent. The banks will only expand if they see profitable opportunities to grant loans and if their fear of failure is diminished. It will take much more than keeping the banks solvent to make them take on the disappeared credit flows.

And, finally, especially in considerably expanding the powers to support the lending of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, government-sponsored enterprises have replaced a significant portion of the mortgage markets. But the government should do much more here as well. For example, failed banks might be kept alive longer as bridge banks under government supervision with the purpose of making credit freely available.

Robert J. Shiller: Animal Spirits Depend on Trust (WSJ)

I don’t want to veer off too far into economics. When I invest, I tend to view economics from a very limited perspective and prefer to focus more on bottom-up factors. But I think that in the solutions Shiller outlines, we can see some of the risks that still exist in our financial system. For much of January, the market has rocketing upwards, but maybe we should exercise a bit of restraint until we see more done by the government in terms of fixing the broken banks and pushing for lending to resume.

With that in mind, I’ve been looking at adding to my portfolio. I’ll likely be reducing my position in Fairfax Financial, it’s around 50% of the portfolio. Instead, I’ll take an approach of adding small positions and gradually increasing them, with the volatility I’ve seen in the past 3 months, this method might be more useful than buying all at once.

Sorry for the thin posting recently, I’ve been going through final exams. This morning I had a chance to watch Charlie Rose’s interview with Nassim Taleb. Like always with Charlie Rose, the interview was top notch:

One of the things that struck me as interesting in the interview was the fact that the prospect of deflation. Nassim Taleb seems to think that that’s where our economy is heading:

CHARLIE ROSE: But let me go — you mentioned Nouriel Roubini, who has been here and who has become well-known as someone who has predicted this and saw it coming, and scares the hell out of people when he comes and sits where you do, because he sees it as getting worse, and even suggests sometimes it may mark the decline of America. How bad do you think…

NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB: I think it is worse than Roubini thinks.

No, I — I had the same story, haven’t changed my story since — and what convinced me of this is that we switched from an environment of inflation, hyperinflation, where people are afraid of commodity prices rising, to a total deflation in no time. Look at inflation bonds…

… I know that we are going have massive deflation. The overhang of debt, massive deflation. Debt needs to be reduced. And I think Paulson seems to be doing a good job, particularly that they were part of the cause of what happened, you know, it is quite commendable.

That got me wondering – what is the best way to invest when you think that deflation is coming? When we, as value investors, invest we look for margins of safety. But if asset prices are falling, the margin of safety quickly contracts. So what are we to do?

Seth Klarman of the Baupost Group touches of this in his book, Margin of Safety. We’re lucky because the book was written only a few years after the junk bond craze, these kinds of topics were on the mind of investors. Here is what Klarman had to say on deflation:

In a deflationary environment assets tend to decline in value. Buying a dollar at 50 cents may not be a bargain if the asset value is dropping. Historically, investors have found attractive opportunities in companies with substantial “hidden assets,” such as an overfunded pension, real estate carried on the balance sheet below market value, or a profitable finance subsidiary that could be sold at a significant gain. Amidst a broad-based decline in business and asset values, however, some hidden assets become less value and in case may become hidden liabilities. A decline in the stock market will reduce the value of pension fund assets; previously overfunded plans may become underfunded. Real estate, carried on companies’ balance sheets at a historical cost, may no longer be undervalued. Overlooked subsidiaries that were once hidden jewels may lose their luster…

The possibility of sustained decreases in business value is a dagger in the heart of value investing (and is not a barrel of laughs for the other investment approaches either).

Which is really the heart of the problem with deflation, especially for value investors. We have to be cautious and not forget the fact that underlying values can indeed decline. This may have been one of the mistakes that some fund managers made when investing in banks while using book value to approximate business value. Book value was simply written down each quarter, ruining whatever margin of safety existed.

Klarman gives us three ways to invest if we think that business value may decline:

First, since investors cannot predict when values will rise or fall, valuation should always be performed conservatively, giving considerable weight to worst-case liquidation value as well as to other methods.

Second, investors fearing deflation could demand a greater than usual discount between price and underlying value in order to make new investments or hold current positions. This means that normally selected investors would probably let even more pitches than usual go by.

Finally, the prospect of asset deflation places a heightened importance on the time frame of investments and on the presence of a catalyst for the realization of underlying value. In a deflationary environment, if you cannot tell whether or not you will realize underlying value, you may not want to get involved at all. If underlying value is realized in the near-term directly for the benefit of shareholders, however, the longer-term forces that could cause to diminish become moot.

These rules are telling us that we need to be even more conservative if we wish to protect against deflation. That means increasing our margin of safety to compensate, and sticking with areas we’re more certain about. Sometimes value investors like to relax their standards so that they can join in the action of the market. They end up buying dollars for 70 or 80 cents and dip their toes in industries outside of their circle of competence. Maybe they’ll invest an an industry where the asset values are much harder to determine, they may make the error of overestimating and skewing their valuations as a whole. So we must become more conservative as the market becomes more turbulent.

With respect to the third factor, I really see this from a special situations perspective. Workouts like risk arbitrage, odd-lot tenders, and so on may be helpful because the price changes should be independent of the market’s precise movements and determined more by the transaction itself usually with a fixed time interval. This gives you the luxury of figuring out when the transaction will be completed so that you can compare it against what the market is doing.

Maybe you’re thinking about investing in an arbitrage situation but you think that asset values will decline over the course of the year. This could affect debt covenants or trigger a material adverse clause and kill the transaction. So you have to keep time in mind. The longer a transaction is supposed to take, the more you risk your capital, especially if you think the value of businesses will be declining.

Investing with macro issues in mind is always a tough thing, especially because its practically impossible to predict exactly what the economy will do. I don’t think that we need to study or spend too much time focusing on the economy though. We simply need to stick close to our principles and maybe exercise more caution that usual. If we do this, our returns should reward us well.

Now, it appears as if even the great universal bank Citigroup (NYSE:C) has become yet another casualty of our financial crisis:

The federal government agreed Sunday to take unprecedented steps to stabilize Citigroup Inc. by moving to guarantee close to $300 billion in troubled assets weighing on the bank’s books, according to people familiar with details of the plan.

Treasury has agreed to inject an additional $20 billion in capital into Citigroup under terms of the deal hashed out between the bank, the Treasury Department, the Federal Reserve, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. Treasury officials will charge a higher interest rate for the capital injection — 8% for the first few years — than it has charged to dozens of other banks now borrowing money under the government’s the $700 billion rescue package approved by Congress last month.

In addition to the capital, Citigroup will have an extremely unusual arrangement in which the government agrees to backstop a roughly $300 billion pool of its assets, containing mortgage-backed securities among other things. Citigroup must absorb the first $37 billion to $40 billion in losses from these assets. If losses extend beyond that level, Treasury will absorb the next $5 billion in losses, followed by the FDIC taking on the next $10 billion in losses. Any losses on these assets beyond that level would be taken by the Fed.

Citigroup would also agree to work to modify — if possible — troubled mortgages held in the $300 billion pool, using standards created by the FDIC after the collapse of IndyMac Bank.

U.S. Agrees to Citigroup Bailout (WSJ)

With the bank trading at a market cap of $20 billion a capital injection of an additional $20 billion would cut the current stock price in half, if I’m reading the terms correctly. The story seems to still be developing, I’ll post more as more details emerge. On the contrary, today’s trading shows us that the $300 billion guarantee is yielding a surge in confidence for Citi, sending their stock price up 56%.

While Warren Buffett of Berkshire Hathaway (NYSE:BRK.A) has mostly come out with praise for Henry Paulson’s bailout plan, he has reserved some criticism aimed at the “hold-to-maturity” price that tax payers would be footing the bill for:

JOE: It’s just that, you know, they want these details, Warren. They said — Paulson says there’s the hold-to-maturity price and there’s the firesale price. We’re going to go somewhere in between, get a much better price but still leave enough for the people that are buying it to make some money. That can be done in principle? There’s a way to do that, do you think?

BUFFETT: I think what I would be looking for -- I heard that hold-to-maturity price. I’m not as excited about that. I basically like a market, or something very close to a market-related price. And there are ways to determine that and I don’t think that Uncle Sam should be in the business of paying somebody a whole lot more than it’s worth in the market today. And if the guy that bought it doesn’t like it, he doesn’t have to sell it, and it was his problem, he bought it in the first place. I think a market price will enable people to be leveraged. The problem they have now is that some of the institutions, they’re loaded with this stuff, they’re having trouble funding, and they’re worried about being able to sell a ton of it. But take the Merrill Lynch deal. Merrill Lynch had to take back 75 percent of the sales price. Well, they didn’t want to take back that 75 percent. I would let ‘em sell it for the same price, but I’d pay them the whole thing in cash. So they’d be a lot better off if they could have sold the whole thing at that same price but gotten paid a hundred percent in cash instead of having to take back 75 percent. And I see the government fulfilling that kind of a function.

CNBC INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT & VIDEO, Part 3: Warren Buffett Explains His $5B Goldman Investment (CNBC)

We know that Buffett announced his investment in Goldman Sachs (NYSE:GS) shortly after details about the bailout plan actually emerged. It’s easy to see why. The government would be purchasing the cancerous toxic assets that have infected financial institutions and forced them to write down their values. Buying these assets at fire sale prices makes sense, even Buffett thinks that there may be opportunities in this area and on CNBC expressed that he would love to have $700 billion to go buy them up.

Unfortunately though, fire sale and hold-to-maturity prices are quite different and are likely to be spread vastly apart. It’s simple to see why he’s not enthusiastic about this aspect of the bailout plan. Warren Buffett is a value investor, he hunts for bargains. Bargain hunting means investing in securities with a sufficient margin of safety or the spread between what a security is selling for and its intrinsic value. Investors usually wish to find wide margins of safety in case something unintended happens, perhaps a problem grows worse than you expect or that you overlooked some aspect of the company your analysis.

The lack of market prices reduces any margin of safety that the government could obtain on these assets and puts taxpayer money at risk for losses. The folks in Washington should try to do something to avoid it. So far, Congress seems to be resisting Paulson’s plan and may have some room to make modifications. They seem to be fighting for basically a few added options – equity stakes in the companies that are bailed out, market pricing, and curbed executive pay. I can see the merits in the first two, equity stakes would provide the government with an upside when bailing out these financial firms. After all, once those toxic assets are taken away many of these companies have nice businesses.

I feel like the executive pay idea is a little too rhetorical and may be too small of a problem when compared to everything else Congress has to worry about. Plus there is the added risk that Congress would waste taxpayer money on the hiring of compensation consultants to tackle the problem which brings to mind a funny quote by Charlie Munger- “I would rather throw a viper down my shirtfront than hire a compensation consultant.”