Street Capitalist: Event Driven Value Investments

Sorry for the thin posting recently, I’ve been going through final exams. This morning I had a chance to watch Charlie Rose’s interview with Nassim Taleb. Like always with Charlie Rose, the interview was top notch:

One of the things that struck me as interesting in the interview was the fact that the prospect of deflation. Nassim Taleb seems to think that that’s where our economy is heading:

CHARLIE ROSE: But let me go — you mentioned Nouriel Roubini, who has been here and who has become well-known as someone who has predicted this and saw it coming, and scares the hell out of people when he comes and sits where you do, because he sees it as getting worse, and even suggests sometimes it may mark the decline of America. How bad do you think…

NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB: I think it is worse than Roubini thinks.

No, I — I had the same story, haven’t changed my story since — and what convinced me of this is that we switched from an environment of inflation, hyperinflation, where people are afraid of commodity prices rising, to a total deflation in no time. Look at inflation bonds…

… I know that we are going have massive deflation. The overhang of debt, massive deflation. Debt needs to be reduced. And I think Paulson seems to be doing a good job, particularly that they were part of the cause of what happened, you know, it is quite commendable.

That got me wondering - what is the best way to invest when you think that deflation is coming? When we, as value investors, invest we look for margins of safety. But if asset prices are falling, the margin of safety quickly contracts. So what are we to do?

Seth Klarman of the Baupost Group touches of this in his book, Margin of Safety. We’re lucky because the book was written only a few years after the junk bond craze, these kinds of topics were on the mind of investors. Here is what Klarman had to say on deflation:

In a deflationary environment assets tend to decline in value. Buying a dollar at 50 cents may not be a bargain if the asset value is dropping. Historically, investors have found attractive opportunities in companies with substantial “hidden assets,” such as an overfunded pension, real estate carried on the balance sheet below market value, or a profitable finance subsidiary that could be sold at a significant gain. Amidst a broad-based decline in business and asset values, however, some hidden assets become less value and in case may become hidden liabilities. A decline in the stock market will reduce the value of pension fund assets; previously overfunded plans may become underfunded. Real estate, carried on companies’ balance sheets at a historical cost, may no longer be undervalued. Overlooked subsidiaries that were once hidden jewels may lose their luster…

The possibility of sustained decreases in business value is a dagger in the heart of value investing (and is not a barrel of laughs for the other investment approaches either).

Which is really the heart of the problem with deflation, especially for value investors. We have to be cautious and not forget the fact that underlying values can indeed decline. This may have been one of the mistakes that some fund managers made when investing in banks while using book value to approximate business value. Book value was simply written down each quarter, ruining whatever margin of safety existed.

Klarman gives us three ways to invest if we think that business value may decline:

First, since investors cannot predict when values will rise or fall, valuation should always be performed conservatively, giving considerable weight to worst-case liquidation value as well as to other methods.

Second, investors fearing deflation could demand a greater than usual discount between price and underlying value in order to make new investments or hold current positions. This means that normally selected investors would probably let even more pitches than usual go by.

Finally, the prospect of asset deflation places a heightened importance on the time frame of investments and on the presence of a catalyst for the realization of underlying value. In a deflationary environment, if you cannot tell whether or not you will realize underlying value, you may not want to get involved at all. If underlying value is realized in the near-term directly for the benefit of shareholders, however, the longer-term forces that could cause to diminish become moot.

These rules are telling us that we need to be even more conservative if we wish to protect against deflation. That means increasing our margin of safety to compensate, and sticking with areas we’re more certain about. Sometimes value investors like to relax their standards so that they can join in the action of the market. They end up buying dollars for 70 or 80 cents and dip their toes in industries outside of their circle of competence. Maybe they’ll invest an an industry where the asset values are much harder to determine, they may make the error of overestimating and skewing their valuations as a whole. So we must become more conservative as the market becomes more turbulent.

With respect to the third factor, I really see this from a special situations perspective. Workouts like risk arbitrage, odd-lot tenders, and so on may be helpful because the price changes should be independent of the market’s precise movements and determined more by the transaction itself usually with a fixed time interval. This gives you the luxury of figuring out when the transaction will be completed so that you can compare it against what the market is doing.

Maybe you’re thinking about investing in an arbitrage situation but you think that asset values will decline over the course of the year. This could affect debt covenants or trigger a material adverse clause and kill the transaction. So you have to keep time in mind. The longer a transaction is supposed to take, the more you risk your capital, especially if you think the value of businesses will be declining.

Investing with macro issues in mind is always a tough thing, especially because its practically impossible to predict exactly what the economy will do. I don’t think that we need to study or spend too much time focusing on the economy though. We simply need to stick close to our principles and maybe exercise more caution that usual. If we do this, our returns should reward us well.

Now, it appears as if even the great universal bank Citigroup (NYSE:C) has become yet another casualty of our financial crisis:

The federal government agreed Sunday to take unprecedented steps to stabilize Citigroup Inc. by moving to guarantee close to $300 billion in troubled assets weighing on the bank’s books, according to people familiar with details of the plan.

Treasury has agreed to inject an additional $20 billion in capital into Citigroup under terms of the deal hashed out between the bank, the Treasury Department, the Federal Reserve, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. Treasury officials will charge a higher interest rate for the capital injection — 8% for the first few years — than it has charged to dozens of other banks now borrowing money under the government’s the $700 billion rescue package approved by Congress last month.

In addition to the capital, Citigroup will have an extremely unusual arrangement in which the government agrees to backstop a roughly $300 billion pool of its assets, containing mortgage-backed securities among other things. Citigroup must absorb the first $37 billion to $40 billion in losses from these assets. If losses extend beyond that level, Treasury will absorb the next $5 billion in losses, followed by the FDIC taking on the next $10 billion in losses. Any losses on these assets beyond that level would be taken by the Fed.

Citigroup would also agree to work to modify — if possible — troubled mortgages held in the $300 billion pool, using standards created by the FDIC after the collapse of IndyMac Bank.

U.S. Agrees to Citigroup Bailout (WSJ)

With the bank trading at a market cap of $20 billion a capital injection of an additional $20 billion would cut the current stock price in half, if I’m reading the terms correctly. The story seems to still be developing, I’ll post more as more details emerge. On the contrary, today’s trading shows us that the $300 billion guarantee is yielding a surge in confidence for Citi, sending their stock price up 56%.

While Warren Buffett of Berkshire Hathaway (NYSE:BRK.A) has mostly come out with praise for Henry Paulson’s bailout plan, he has reserved some criticism aimed at the “hold-to-maturity” price that tax payers would be footing the bill for:

JOE: It’s just that, you know, they want these details, Warren. They said — Paulson says there’s the hold-to-maturity price and there’s the firesale price. We’re going to go somewhere in between, get a much better price but still leave enough for the people that are buying it to make some money. That can be done in principle? There’s a way to do that, do you think?

BUFFETT: I think what I would be looking for -- I heard that hold-to-maturity price. I’m not as excited about that. I basically like a market, or something very close to a market-related price. And there are ways to determine that and I don’t think that Uncle Sam should be in the business of paying somebody a whole lot more than it’s worth in the market today. And if the guy that bought it doesn’t like it, he doesn’t have to sell it, and it was his problem, he bought it in the first place. I think a market price will enable people to be leveraged. The problem they have now is that some of the institutions, they’re loaded with this stuff, they’re having trouble funding, and they’re worried about being able to sell a ton of it. But take the Merrill Lynch deal. Merrill Lynch had to take back 75 percent of the sales price. Well, they didn’t want to take back that 75 percent. I would let ‘em sell it for the same price, but I’d pay them the whole thing in cash. So they’d be a lot better off if they could have sold the whole thing at that same price but gotten paid a hundred percent in cash instead of having to take back 75 percent. And I see the government fulfilling that kind of a function.

CNBC INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT & VIDEO, Part 3: Warren Buffett Explains His $5B Goldman Investment (CNBC)

We know that Buffett announced his investment in Goldman Sachs (NYSE:GS) shortly after details about the bailout plan actually emerged. It’s easy to see why. The government would be purchasing the cancerous toxic assets that have infected financial institutions and forced them to write down their values. Buying these assets at fire sale prices makes sense, even Buffett thinks that there may be opportunities in this area and on CNBC expressed that he would love to have $700 billion to go buy them up.

Unfortunately though, fire sale and hold-to-maturity prices are quite different and are likely to be spread vastly apart. It’s simple to see why he’s not enthusiastic about this aspect of the bailout plan. Warren Buffett is a value investor, he hunts for bargains. Bargain hunting means investing in securities with a sufficient margin of safety or the spread between what a security is selling for and its intrinsic value. Investors usually wish to find wide margins of safety in case something unintended happens, perhaps a problem grows worse than you expect or that you overlooked some aspect of the company your analysis.

The lack of market prices reduces any margin of safety that the government could obtain on these assets and puts taxpayer money at risk for losses. The folks in Washington should try to do something to avoid it. So far, Congress seems to be resisting Paulson’s plan and may have some room to make modifications. They seem to be fighting for basically a few added options - equity stakes in the companies that are bailed out, market pricing, and curbed executive pay. I can see the merits in the first two, equity stakes would provide the government with an upside when bailing out these financial firms. After all, once those toxic assets are taken away many of these companies have nice businesses.

I feel like the executive pay idea is a little too rhetorical and may be too small of a problem when compared to everything else Congress has to worry about. Plus there is the added risk that Congress would waste taxpayer money on the hiring of compensation consultants to tackle the problem which brings to mind a funny quote by Charlie Munger- “I would rather throw a viper down my shirtfront than hire a compensation consultant.”