Street Capitalist: Event Driven Value Investments

An interesting look at the credit card industry:

Max Olson of Future Blind has put together a great article that chronicles the career of Sardar Biglari, CEO of Steak N Shake (NYSE:SNS). Be sure to read the full article:

From little more than a $1.8 million stake in a small chain of buffets, Sardar Biglari was now managing a holding company with a market value of more than $340 million. Though the company will likely end up growing through busi- nesses outside the restaurant industry, the Steak n Shake brand will continue to be its figurehead. And whether or not they thrive depends on if they can keep cus- tomers coming in the door. If the success of McDonald’s and In-N-Out Burger are any indication, a well-run restaurant chain like Steak n Shake can be both popular and profitable.

The Steak n Shake Company is now on solid footing. But the actual turna- round, one that may leave the company unrecognizable from its prior form, has just begun. “Naturally,” says Biglari, “we have a fairly lengthy journey before reach- ing our goals. We will do what it takes to prevail.”

The Restaurant Investor by Max Olson

The folks over at Dealbook have Paulson’s 3Q investor letter up. The letter is peppered with his insights from stocks to defaulted bonds.

What I wanted to do though, was highlight a few parts of the letter where I thought we could take a look at his methodology for looking at stocks. The idea here isn’t to find potential buys, but to see how he looks at companies.

Bank of America (NYSE:BAC)

-Paulson believes that by 2011, banks will have passed the write down cycle and return to growth in 2012.
-They are using a 10x normalized earnings multiple for large banks and the team estimates BAC to be worth $29.81 per share in 2011. Current shares trade at $16.35, so you are looked at almost 40% annualized.
-They expect provision for credit losses to come down quite a bit from 2008 levels, to 1.75%. That figure, $16,357 is about 61% of 2008′s numbers.

Then, there is Paulson’s gold position. If you looked at the latest 13F-HR filings, there are a lot of ways that investors have been playing gold. Some are going after miners, others are gaining exposure via ETFs, and then there are some that are trying to get their hands on the physical asset.

Paulson mentions two gold miners in his portfolio. This is how he looks at them:

-Five gold mining stocks comprise 14% of their portfolio.
-All five stocks would have upside in a flat environment, but an even higher upside in a rising price environment.
-AngloGold Ashanti (NYSE:AU) is the third largest gold producer in the world but trades at a lower Price/NAV than peers. So this is a value play based on comps.
-The company has a number of figures, which could contribute to its peer undervaluation:
1. Exposure to South Africa
2. Declining production profile
3. Large hedge book
4. Poor safety record.
-Paulson & Co. believe that the new CEO, Mark Cutifani would be a catalyst for change in the company and indeed: the company diversified out of South Africa, reduced their hedge book, increased their production profile, and improved their safety record.

So what we can take away here is that Paulson and his team were looking for a gold miner undervalued, relative to peers and viewed Cutifani, a great mining operator, as a catalyst.

Then, there is Gabriel Resources (TSE:GBU)

-Gabriel is another miner with an event catalyst
-The company is the largest potential goldmine in Europe and Paulson & Co. own 19.9% of it.
-NGOs have stymied the process for the mine to get their permit due to environmental concerns
-Newmont Mining and Electrum Strategic are other large owners of the company with 16% and 19% stakes
-Though the company trades at only $2 per share, the upside can go to $6-8 and $8-12 if they receive their permit and start production.

Gabriel appears to be a low risk high uncertainty situation with a binary outcome. Without their permit, the company is likely to trade flat while having a number of potential catalysts in place to unlock value.

Be sure to read the rest of the letter at the NYTimes Dealbook.

This is an interesting, pretty contrarian perspective to the Berkshire Hathaway (NYSE:BRK.A) and Burlington Northern Santa Fe (NYSE:BNI) deal:

Bruce Greenwald’s comments on the BNI deal (Advisor Perspectives):

I know you own Berkshire Hathaway, so I have to ask you what you think about Buffett’s purchase of Burlington Northern.

It’s a crazy deal. It’s an insane deal. We looked at Burlington Northern at $75 and I’ll give you the exact calculation we did. You don’t have a high earnings return. They are paying 18 times earnings, but it’s really much worse than that. They report maintenance cap-ex very carefully. They report depreciation and amortization, and they report only about 70% of the maintenance cap-ex. So they are under-depreciating, and their profit numbers are lower than the true profit numbers – and in a bad way, because the tax shield for the depreciation is undergone too. Their profitability is much lower than it looks.

Buffett’s paying 18-times [at $100/share] and at $75 he was paying 16-times. Our calculation is he was paying 21-times.

Secondly, there are two kinds of assets. There are the rights-of-way, which you can’t get rid of. So there’s no issue about having to earn a return on them because you have to keep it in the business, and because there’s nothing they can do with those rights-of-way. If you look at the asset value of the non-right-of-way equipment, and you write it up because it’s more expensive than it was originally, you get an asset value that’s very close to the earnings power value. We didn’t see a lot franchise value or hidden asset value.

The other thing is that if you try to calculate sustainable earnings, you have to cope with the fact that earnings are up enormously since 2003, when oil went up. There is a simple calculation you can do, which compares the cost-per-ton-mile for freight for a truck versus a railroad. If you build the increase in the price of diesel fuel into the post-2003 experience, when revenues suddenly start to grow, what you see is that the entire growth of the revenue is accounted for by the energy advantage that the railroads have and therefore how much business they can capture from the truckers, and how much pricing they can get because the competition is now more expensive.

There is nothing special about the railroads. It’s entirely an energy play.

If you look at what their margins should have gone up by, given the energy efficiency, the margins go up by only about half of that. So you don’t have a good aggressive management over these five years producing outsized returns.

We looked back at when they did the merger with Santa Fe, because then they did increase margins. But they got bored with it, and margins started to come down. The same thing happened recently. We don’t see a lot of hidden profitability in the culture of the company.

It looked to us like an oil play. He has a history of making bad oil play decisions. And that was at $75/share, we thought there were better oil plays. At $100/share we think he has lost his mind.

Wow! Big news this morning. Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway (NYSE:BRK.A) is set to acquire Burlington Northern Santa Fe (NYSE:BNI)

Berkshire Hathaway Inc. said it will acquire the 77% of Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corp. it doesn’t already own in a cash and stock deal that values the railroad company at $34 billion and marks Warren Buffet’s largest acquisition.

The deal values Burlington Northern at $100 a share, a 31% premium to Monday’s closing price.

“Berkshire’s $34 billion investment in BNSF is a huge bet on that company, Chief Executive Matt Rose and his team, and the railroad industry,” Mr. Buffett said in prepared statement. Berkshire also will assume $10 billion of outstanding Burlington Northern debt.

“Most important of all, however, it’s an all-in wager on the economic future of the United States,” Mr. Buffett said. “I love those bets.”

The deal provides that each Burlington Northern share will be at the election of the shareholder to be converted into the right to receive either a cash payment of $100 or a variable number of Berkshire’s Class A or Class B stock.

The deal is expected to close in the first quarter.

Separately, Berkshire’s board approved a 50-for-1 split of its Class B stock. The company said a great majority of the stock issued by Berkshire in the acquisition would be its “A” shares, but “B” shares will also be needed to accommodate holders of smaller amounts of Burlington Northern’s shares who opt for a share of exchange rather than a cash payment.

Berkshire to Acquire Burlington Northern (WSJ)

The really interesting thing here is that Buffett is set to use Berkshire shares for the acquisition. I can’t remember the last time that he did this, I know he really regretted it with Dexter Shoe Co.:

In 1993, Berkshire paid $433 million for the Maine-based company. Rather than use cash, Buffett used Berkshire Class A stock to fund the purchase. That Berkshire stock is worth eight times more now, giving the Omaha, Nebraska-based insurance and investment company a $216 billion market value.

Dexter didn’t make it that long. It ended shoe production in the United States and Puerto Rico in 2001, and Berkshire folded what was left into its H.H. Brown Shoe Group unit.

“What I had assessed as durable competitive advantage vanished within a few years,” Buffett wrote on Friday. “By using Berkshire stock, I compounded this error hugely. That move made the cost to Berkshire shareholders not $400 million, but rather $3.5 billion. In essence, I gave away 1.6 percent of a wonderful business — one now valued at $220 billion — to buy a worthless business.”

“To date, Dexter is the worst deal that I’ve made,” Buffett went on. “But I’ll make more mistakes in the future – you can bet on that. A line from Bobby Bare’s country song explains what too often happens with acquisitions: ‘I’ve never gone to bed with an ugly woman, but I’ve sure woke up with a few.’”

Buffett calls Dexter Shoe his worst deal ever (Reuters)

I know some people think that the capital expenditures of railroad companies are likely to be limited in the future as much of the track has been already laid. Most capex would then go to maintenance, with the rest being gravy for the owner. This could be a big motivator for Buffett changing his mind on railroads and becoming so bullish.