Street Capitalist: Event Driven Value Investments

Over the last few weeks, I have spent a lot of time trying to find certain industries that appear undervalued. One area is insurance, where many insurers with good combined ratios and past performance are trading below book. I was happy to see Wilbur Ross agree in this Q&A with Fortune:

Where do you think the biggest opportunities are now?

There are deep value opportunities in insurance stocks, which were beaten down because of their exposure to the subprime crisis, annuities, and commercial real estate. I won’t name names, but some well-managed life insurance and fire and casualty companies will come through this stronger. They used to trade at one or two times book value but now trade at three-quarters book…

Mr. Distress is ready to buy (Fortune)

A quick look at Google shows us how the sector is looking for reinsurance players:

Most appear pretty cheap on the basis of book value. For the moment, it seems as if these companies are trading at discounts mainly due to market conditions. Most insurance companies are reporting that they are still in a soft market. I know that the folks at W.R. Berkley are expecting that things will start to turn. One indicator of that, to me, seems to be with the uptick in M&A activity. We saw Fairfax Financial acquire Zenith, and recently Perry Capital urged Endurance Services to find a merger partner:

PEMBROKE, Bermuda—One of the largest shareholders of Endurance Specialty Holdings Ltd. has urged the Pembroke, Bermuda-based insurer to find a merger partner.

New York-based hedge fund manager Perry Corp.—which owns 12.6% of Endurance and whose president, Richard C. Perry, is a member of its board of directors—said in a regulatory filing Monday that it expects consolidation in the Bermuda reinsurance market to accelerate in the near term.

Endurance “should undertake an evaluation of its strategic alternatives and pursue a possible merger or other strategic transaction in order to create a stronger company with a defined growth strategy,” Perry, which does business as Perry Capital L.L.C., wrote in the filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

In addition, Perry said recent executive appointments at Endurance will “not position the insurer to capitalize on consolidation opportunities.”

Endurance Shareholder Urges Merger (Business Insurance)

Richard Perry might also see the reinsurance sector as undervalued, which is why he thinks opportunities are ripe for Endurance Services. If that is not enough, we also saw Warren Buffett purchase stakes in Munich Re and Swiss Re. Smart, value savvy investors appear to be really interested in these companies and I think they are worth a look.

To me, the key will be to find insurance companies that are trading at low multiples with the capacity to increase policy volumes as the market improves.

(Click for full size)

I still like Fairfax given its book value growth, great management team, and current price. However, I see plenty of other opportunities worth analyzing, especially with P&C insurers. I plan on posting some work that I have been doing on insurance companies sometime this week, so be sure to look for that.

My friend Miguel Barbosa has an excellent interview with James Montier (of GMO and author of: Value Investing: Tools and Techniques for Intelligent Investment). I thought I would give you a couple of excerpts, I believe the whole interview is worth reading and suggest you do so. Miguel tells me that he should have his second part up soon.

A few days ago, when discussing value investing, a friend asked me why value investing does not stop working. Value investing thrives because of certain inefficiencies in the market and it has been written about for more than 70 years now. So why doesn’t the market catch on? Montier provides us with an answer:

Miguel: Tell us about the price = quality heuristic? Why do investors overpay for beauty and underpay for toads…after all they are one step away from becoming princes are they not? This heuristic complements the Anginer et all study where ugly defendants are more likely to be found guilty and receive longer sentences than attractive defendants.

James Montier: We humans have a bizarre bias against a bargain. For instance, my friend Dan Ariely has done some great experiments in this field showing some pretty odd findings. Imagine you taste two glasses of wine one you are told comes from a $10 bottle, the other comes from a $90 bottle. You will almost certainly say that the $90 wine tastes much better. The only snag is that the two wines are exactly the same. So never come to dinner at my house, because I’ll give $10 wine, and tell you it costs $90!

The same thing happens with pain killers. It is why branded pain killers exist alongside generic equivalents. They both have exactly the same active ingredient, but people report the branded version works better.

I suspect that something similar happens with stocks. Stocks are the one thing we don’t like to see on sale. So a ‘cheap’ stock must have something wrong with it, and an ‘expensive’ stock must be a sign of quality – at least that’s the way we tend to view things.

The Anginer et al study shows some similar findings in the legal context. Ugly defendants get far worse sentences, than attractive defendants. We have a hard time believing that attractive people could have been bad – a kind of halo effect, if you will.

If you haven’t already, I really suggest you read Dan Ariely’s book Predictably Irrational, it is one of my favorites. Montier gets at why I think markets wont figure out value investing — the participants are too irrational. Usually, what you will see are investors who claim to practice value investing, only to abandon it when things get tough. It is a style of investing that requires levelheadedness, courage, and patience, which many investors lack.

One of the topics Montier touches on is short selling, which I thought was pretty interesting. Most value investors don’t short, so it is always nice to take a look at the ones who do:

Miguel: Tell us about the folly of using price to sales as a proxy for value.

James Montier: Price to sales is fine if you are looking for short candidates, but as a long side value criteria it makes no sense to be at all. After all as long as you promise to value me on price to sales, I’ll set up a business selling $20 bills for $19…I’ll never make a profit, but if you are looking at price to sales you won’t care.

Price to sales is typical of the drift up the income statement when the bottom line gets too demanding. If your PE starts to look expensive, get everyone to look at a less demanding metric, enter stage left price to sales. If that starts to look tough, abandon the income statement and look at the value based on eyeballs and clicks!

Miguel: What I enjoy about your writing is that you aren’t afraid to talk about “controversial topics” – yes I’m talking about your work on short selling. Can you quickly tell us what you have learned about short sellers (their characteristics, screens, etc).

James Montier: Short sellers are everyone’s favorite scapegoats. They make money when things go ‘wrong’. Of course, what the authorities forget is that simply because a short seller sells a stock, doesn’t mean it goes down – if only it were that easy we’d all be short sellers. As David Einhorn observed, I’m not critical because I’m short, I’m short because I‘m critical.

In my experience, short sellers are amongst the most fundamental investors you’ll come across. They understand the ins and outs of a business better than just about everyone else. They are highly skilled at figuring out poor economics when they see if. They act as acting police, helping to uncover fraud – something that the regulators used to do (a very long time ago).

My own work on short selling has focused on a number of areas. In general, shorts tend to come into a couple of categories: bad businesses (i.e. poor economics), bad accounting (obvious), bad management (the guys at the top haven’t got a clue). In addition I often look for several traits, such as expensive, unrealistic growth expectations, too much debt, and poor capital discipline (i.e. needless and tangential M&A).

I also created a measure called the C-score (C is for cheating or cooking the books). It aims to look for the quantitative red flags which often accompany bad accounting.

Excerpt: Details of the C score Page 263 of Value Investing Tools & Techniques for Intelligent Investment

1. A growing difference between net income and cash flow from operations.
2. Day sales outstanding is increasing.
3. Growing days sales of inventory
4. Increasing other current assets to revenues.
5. Declines in depreciation relative to gross property plant and equipment.
6. High total asset growth.

Miguel Barbosa interviews James Montier (Simoleon Sense)

Those are just two questions that Montier answered. There are many more over at Simoleon Sense and I highly recommend the interview.

Meridee A. Moore runs Watershed Asset Management, a $2B hedge fund in San Francisco. She gave the NYTimes an interview on management, and I thought the following test she gives analysts is pretty interesting:

Q. What are some other screens?

A. We give people a two-hour test. We try to simulate a real office experience by giving them an investment idea and the raw material, the annual report, some documents, and then we tell them where the securities prices are. We say: “Here’s a calculator, a pencil and a sandwich. We’ll be back in two hours.” If an analyst comes in there and just attacks the project with relish, that’s a good sign.

Q. Is this one of those impossible tests, where you’re asking them to do seven hours of work in two hours?

A. Yes. But you’d be amazed at how well people do. After two hours, two of us go in and just let the person talk about what he’s done. The nice thing about my being trained as a lawyer, and never going to business school, is that I’m able to ask the basic, financially naïve questions, like: “What does the company do? How do they make money? Who are their customers? What do they make? How do they produce it?” That throws some people off.

Q. Really?

A. Often, analysts go right to the financials and forget to think about the company’s business model. If the person avoids answering the basic questions and instead changes the subject to talk about the work they did, that tells me the person is a bit rigid. Instead of trying to respond to what’s being asked, they’re trying to get an A on the test.

Also, if they’re a little too worried about pleasing me, that’s not good, either, because it’s not a please-the-boss competition. The point of the exercise is to make sure that we’ve thought about the issues critically, so we are in a position to make a good investment decision.

The other quality we look for is whether the person can distill a lot of very complicated information down to its essence. Can you figure out the three or four issues that are most important for understanding this investment? Or do you get distracted by aspects of the company that really have nothing to do with making an investment or determining value?

An Office? She’ll Pass on That (NY Times)

This is kind of funny for me. It sounds stupid, but when I decide to look at a company, my first task is to scribble “How they make money: …” and use that to shape the rest of my analysis. I’ve found I often make mistakes when I try to tackle things from a purely financial perspective and it helps to take a step back and look at how to business works and then see how that translates into its financials.

Hunt Alcott, a behavioral economist with MIT, talks about improving consumer decision making when it comes to making better choices regarding energy usage. I thought it was pretty interesting that he cites Robert Cialdini’s work in psychology. As you know, Cialdini’s book Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion is one of Charlie Munger’s favorites:

Q. To what extent will consumers make different choices if they simply have the facts about energy explained to them in a clear manner?

A. The effect of clearer information is an empirical question that often has surprising answers. One example of this is from OPOWER, a company that our research group interacts with a lot. OPOWER sends home energy use reports to households that compare those households to their neighbors and give energy conservation tips. The information in these reports is very similar to what’s already on a utility bill: How much did you spend this month, how much did you spend this year, here’s where you can get compact fluorescent lightbulbs. But something about the way they’re presenting it — presumably the way they use comparisons to neighbors — seems to be very powerful. I’m not sure it would have been obvious to any of us 10 years ago or three years ago that this program would have large effects in the real world.

There was an academic study by psychologist Bob Cialdini and co-authors that helped provide the proof-of-concept for the OPOWER program. In this study, the researchers left door-hangers at a group of households in California. Some of the door-hangers said, “Save money by saving energy,” some of them said, “Save the environment,” and some said, “Here’s how much your neighbors are using.” And the ones that said, “Here’s how much your neighbors are using” had a much stronger impact on energy consumption. In the last couple of years that study in particular has had a lot of influence.

Q. Okay, so why is it that referring to neighbors is effective?

A. Psychologists have been great at documenting that if you tell people what the social norm is, people will converge to the social norm. In my mind there are two leading economic hypotheses for why this works in energy consumption. One is called “conditional cooperation.” People may be altruistic, and they view conserving energy as contributing to the public good of reducing climate change. People are typically more willing to contribute to a public good if they are informed that other people are contributing more than they are.

The other explanation is just social inference. It could be that I couldn’t care less about the environment, but I do want to save money. And if you tell me that I’m using twice as much energy as my neighbor, that lets me know that maybe I’ve been leaving a window open or that my furnace is inefficient. So that’s purely a self-interested, informational story. Testing between these two explanations is one of the research questions we’re interested in.

3 Questions: Hunt Alcott on behavioral economics and the energy crisis (MIT)

This is a real gem:

But I was mistaken. There was never a prize in the lot. I could read of railway accidents every day — the newspaper atmosphere was foggy with them; but somehow they never came my way. I found I had spent a good deal of money in the accident business, and had nothing to show for it. My suspicions were aroused, and I began to hunt around for somebody that had won in this lottery. I found plenty of people who had invested, but not an individual that had ever had an accident or made a cent. I stopped buying accident tickets and went to ciphering. The result was astounding. ‘THE PERIL LAY NOT IN TRAVELLING, BUT IN STAYING AT HOME .

I hunted up statistics, and was amazed to find that after all the glaring newspaper headings concerning railroad disasters, less than three hundred people had really lost their lives by those disasters in the preceding twelve months. The Erie road was set down as the most murderous in the list. It had killed forty-six — or twenty-six, I do not exactly remember which, but I know the number was double that of any other road. But the fact straightway suggested itself that the Erie was an immensely long road, and did more business than any other line in the country; so the double number of killed ceased to be matter for surprise.

By further figuring, it appeared that between New York and Rochester the Erie ran eight passenger trains each way every day — sixteen altogether; and carried a daily average of 6,000 persons. That is about a million in six months — the population of New York city. Well, the Erie kills from thirteen to twenty-three persons out of its million in six months; and in the same time 13,000 of New York’s million die in their beds! My flesh crept, my hair stood on end. “This is appalling!” I said. “The danger isn’t in travelling by rail, but in trusting to those deadly beds. I will never sleep in a bed again.”

(Mark Twain Quotes)

Most people fixate on interesting accidents over frequent accidents. This often causes sensationalist reporting and people start to fear a shark attack over crashing into a deer, even though the latter is 300 times more likely to occur.

For investors there are some take aways too. If you talk to an ordinary person about what they are interested in investing in, you are likely to be disappointed. Most would rather have the thrill and excitement in investing in what everyone thinks will be the next big thing. But if you look at the evidence from the past, these investments are usually almost always failures. The powers of creative destruction almost always ensure that new industries are rife with failures as businessmen gradually figure out the right economics. Instead, You are much better off looking at industries that have withstood the test of time and are trading at undervalued levels.

(Photo: Peter J. Thompson/National Post)

A friend recently attended an talk with Prem Watsa of Fairfax Financial (PINK:FRFHF / TSE:FFH). I know there are a lot of Fairfax followers on here, it is a company I’ve been bullish on for a while. Here are some of their notes. Keep in mind, these are just notes, they could be totally wrong:

The Soft P&C Market:
If you look at the insurance sector, a number of businesses are trading at low multiples because of the current pressures of the soft market. Some, like the management over at W.R. Berkely believe that the market is poised to turn around.

-Fairfax has wide reach. Active in over 100 countries, 25% premiums outside of N. America
-Fairfax faces declining volumes because of soft market but Fairfax has power to write more business if they see things improved.
-Globally, P&C markets remain soft. Signs of improvement in certain regions: Northbridge managed to raise rates in Canada.
-Fairfax could easily double underwriting volumes in the face of hard market, boosting earnings and investment float

The Investment Environment:
As some of you may know, Watsa’s Hamblin-Watsa Investment Counsel takes Fairfax’s float and uses it to make investments in all sorts of securities. They have an excellent track record of beating the market over the years.

-Watsa sees the possibility that growth will be flat as we may encounter deflationary pressures on the economy.
-Fairfax has structured their investment portfolio so that it can withstand a 50% drop in equity markets in addition to major CAT losses.
-Fairfax continues to be conservative about the markets and has 30% of the equity portfolio hedged with index swaps.
-2/3 of their muni bonds are insured by Berkshire Hathaway. Most were purchased near bottom prices. This boosts their yield on the portfolio which has an extra kicker of being tax exempt securities with a 5.75% average yield
-Some opportunities for value investors but they are becoming fewer.
-Target holding at least $1B in cash at holdco level in case of negative events.

Zenith Acquisition:
Fairfax recently acquired Zenith National Insurance Group. The company specialized in workers comp insurance and ran a conservatively managed investment portfolio.

-Fairfax has known Zenith management for over 20 years. Zenith has an excellent underwriting record and the company scaled back volumes because of soft market
-Zenith has a vanilla investment portfolio, Fairfax intends to have Hamblin-Watsa take over and try to boost performance
-Crum & Forster may be able to sell products through Zenith’s network of brokers and agents.

Michael Lewis has a new book coming out called The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine and like everything else Lewis writes, it is sure to be awesome. Vanity Fair has an excerpt of the book and I suggest you all read it whenever you get a chance. It is a great read about investor Michael Burry:

To his swelling audience, it didn’t seem to matter whether the stock market rose or fell; Mike Burry found places to invest money shrewdly. He used no leverage and avoided shorting stocks. He was doing nothing more promising than buying common stocks and nothing more complicated than sitting in a room reading financial statements. Scion Capital’s decision-making apparatus consisted of one guy in a room, with the door closed and the shades down, poring over publicly available information and data on 10-K Wizard. He went looking for court rulings, deal completions, and government regulatory changes—anything that might change the value of a company.

As often as not, he turned up what he called “ick” investments. In October 2001 he explained the concept in his letter to investors: “Ick investing means taking a special analytical interest in stocks that inspire a first reaction of ‘ick.’” A court had accepted a plea from a software company called the Avanti Corporation. Avanti had been accused of stealing from a competitor the software code that was the whole foundation of Avanti’s business. The company had $100 million in cash in the bank, was still generating $100 million a year in free cash flow—and had a market value of only $250 million! Michael Burry started digging; by the time he was done, he knew more about the Avanti Corporation than any man on earth. He was able to see that even if the executives went to jail (as five of them did) and the fines were paid (as they were), Avanti would be worth a lot more than the market then assumed. To make money on Avanti’s stock, however, he’d probably have to stomach short-term losses, as investors puked up shares in horrified response to negative publicity.

“That was a classic Mike Burry trade,” says one of his investors. “It goes up by 10 times, but first it goes down by half.” This isn’t the sort of ride most investors enjoy, but it was, Burry thought, the essence of value investing. His job was to disagree loudly with popular sentiment. He couldn’t do this if he was at the mercy of very short-term market moves, and so he didn’t give his investors the ability to remove their money on short notice, as most hedge funds did. If you gave Scion your money to invest, you were stuck for at least a year.

Betting on the Blind Side (Vanity Fair)

Today, CNBC had Warren Buffett of Berkshire Hathaway (NYSE:BRK-A / BRK-B) on for a few hours, answering questions on everything from Coca-Cola to Greece’s financial crisis. There were some interesting exchanges and you can pore over the entire transcript at CNBC, but I would like to highlight a bit of it.

On Coca-Cola

I’ve blogged in the past on Coca-Cola’s (NYSE:KO) decision to purchase its bottling unit Coca-Cola Enterprises (NYSE:CCE). To me the strategic rationale was that Coke wanted to get control over distribution so that they could more agilely deploy new products to the market place. Buffett seems to agree here, and does note that the bottling business is in general worse than the concentrate business. I thought it was interesting that Indra Nooyi was brought onto the call, she provided some good insight on why Pepsi did their deal:

QUICK: Well, we do want to ask you about another one of your companies, Warren. Coca-Cola came out and surprised a lot of people with this news that it’s going to be buying the North American bottling operations. This is different than what they’d been talking about in the past.

BUFFETT: Right.

QUICK: And it follows what Pepsi did about a year ago; in fact, follows very closely what they’d been doing. What do you think about this deal?

BUFFETT: Well, I think on balance I like it. I mean, Muhtar Kent has done a fabulous job with Coke, and there’s a lot of execution problems in doing anything like that. Pepsi will have them and we’ll have them at Coke. But with Muhtar, I feel confident in the fact that it will get carried off right now. The bottling business is very different than what they call the concentrate business, which is making the Cola-Cola concentrate, gets turned into syrup, gets turned into Cola-Cola. The bottling business is very capital intensive and has low margins. The concentrate business is not capital intensive and has very wide margins. Literally, Coca-Cola with 5 billion of capital could make 8 or 9 billion pre-tax just from the concentrate business. But the bottling business is an entirely different business. So long-term, I like being in the concentrate business much more than the bottling business. But the bottling business, Coca-Cola has what they call a fountain division that sells direct. They have the bottlers. Any time they get a new product there’s a question of how it comes under this contract that originally goes back to 1899. It needed rationalization and this move is a big, big step toward rationalizing it, make it so it’s more–it’s more friendly to the big box retailers of Walmart or some–Costco or somebody like that. And it–but it will–there will be some real execution time involved in it and over time, you would hope that Coca-Cola would have less money involved in the bottling business, because it’s a less attractive business.

QUICK: Obviously, you’re a long-term shareholder, but when you say that there are very likely to be come execution steps, some difficulties along the way, maybe some stumbles, how much patience do you have as an investor? You talking about year or two?

BUFFETT: I–well, no, I just say that–whenever you’re doing anything this big you better–you have to have a lot of confidence in the management and I have confidence in Muhtar to carry this off…

KERNEN: All right. I kind of understand a lot of that, how, you know, you don’t want the two companies competing. But there was a rationale at one point to do it that way, and Mr. Buffett had pointed out the different–you know, it’s a low margin bottling business vs. a high margin syrup business. What exactly changed? Why–you are going to deploy more capital–or you have deployed more to own the bottlers. Why not leave them owned by someone else with a lower margin business? What’s changed? You say something’s changed to make it make more sense.

NOOYI: Yeah, that’s a great question, Joe. So 10, 20 years ago, the market–the beverage market in North America was essentially carbonated soft drinks, and there were a few megabrands that controlled the business, and the market was growing 6, 7 percent in terms of volume. Fast-forward to today. Carbonated soft drinks are now less than 50 percent of the total market, and that’s a very highly profitable part of the whole market. And the overall liquid refreshment beverage business is growing in volume about minus 2 percent and in value about 1 percent positive. So this is not a huge growth business. It’s a big market, it’s about $100 billion category. But it’s not growing in leaps and bounds like it used to a couple of decades ago. When you have one or two publicly listed companies positioned as growth companies trying to fight over a profit pool, that’s not a very good situation, especially if the profit pool is not growing enough to feed the appetites of two or three publicly listed companies. So the only way to compete and stay ahead of competition in this environment is to bring the profit pools back together and figure out how to operate more efficiently.

KERNEN: Warren, you were going to talk about the Coke strategy abroad, right, with their–I guess they’re not buying in those assets, right?

BUFFETT: Well, the–no. The franchise operation works extremely well around the–around the world. And, I mean, you take somebody like Coca-Cola FEMSA in Mexico, I mean, the per capitas there are incredible. I think they’re up close to 500 or thereabouts. And so the franchise system in just country after country, 200 countries around the world, has developed the market in a way that’s been very good for the bottlers and very good for Coca-Cola. And actually, in many countries the bottling operation has been considerably more profitable than it has been in the United States, partly because of the growth aspect that Indra mentioned. So it’s not a system that needs fixing at all around the world. There can be an occasional spot where the bottler isn’t doing the job and the Coca-Cola company will buy it and then–and put it back on its feet and then resell it to somebody in that country. But having local bottlers really works pretty darn well around the globe.

QUINTANILLA: Warren, some people…

QUICK: Warren, there–right.

QUINTANILLA: Some people have been saying that you–people historically bought Coke as an international growth play. Now all the sudden North America’s an awfully bigger piece of the pie. Does it dilute some of the reasons that people got into the stock in the first place?

BUFFETT: No. In terms of where the money is being made, you know, Coke makes, I don’t know exact percentage, but 80 percent of its money around the globe, and it’s growing and just in country after country. Coke has been gaining share really quarter after quarter around the world. And add–none of that volume’s going away, or none of that growth is going away because they’re integrating the bottling system in the United States. It does–it means a concentration more of assets in the United States, but it does not take away from the profit growth that is occurring around the–around the world. I think Coke earned like 9 billion pretax last year, and I think well over 7 billion of that was from outside of North America. And that 7 billion is going to have the same kind of growth rate, which has been substantial, whether or not–you know, wherever the bottling system in the United States is owned.

On Currencies
This is a pretty interesting question because in the past, Berkshire has done some currency trading, particularly with the Brazilian Real.

QUICK: You said, though, that a bet either for or against a currency is a bet for or against that government. If you were worried, and let’s say you’re worry level and let’s just measure a couple of things against each other, euro vs. the dollar, which worries you more?

BUFFETT: That’s a tough–that’s a tough call. I mean, both the euro, European Union countries and the United States are running very large deficits. I mean, they–both of those currencies in terms of purchasing power will decline in value over time in my judgment.

QUICK: British pound vs. the dollar. Is that the same story?

BUFFETT: Same way. I–there are all–they are all following policies that will cause their currencies to lose value. Which one will lose more value than the other, it’s so hard to tell.

QUICK: Yen vs. the dollar? Same story?

BUFFETT: The yen is–Japan is the great mystery of all time. I mean, in terms of the policies they follow, what happens, you know, low interest rates, huge deficits and all of that sort of thing. That one is a mystery I don’t even try to think about solving.

Private Equity:

Private equity gets a lot of criticism for acquiring companies and then piling them up with debt to juice their returns. Usually, the companies that can survive that kind of treatment end up performing quite well when IPOed, but many fail in the process. I am expecting that if we see a big bankruptcy wave, these companies will do pretty well. A lot are great businesses that are just overburdened with debt. I would imagine distressed debt guys like Baupost, Third Avenue, and others will make a killing on these plays. After all, Buffett himself said that he would love to buy TXU at bargain prices if it went into bankruptcy.

KERNEN: One of the reasons I brought up that TXU situation was because in the piece it said there’s a lot of really great companies that–in the private equity universe that have really lousy balance sheets based on the bubble that was around in 2007. So there’s going to be some problems. But is that somewhere where you can look to try to help work out some of the situations? There must be some real gems in there that just, for whatever reason, I look at the fees that the PE firms take, and I look at the dividends that they pay out, and it used to work, but now they actually got to manage some of these things. I mean, couldn’t you find some nuggets in there?

BUFFETT: It’s possible, Joe, but on balance, if you notice, the private equity firms are very reluctant, it seems to me, to come forth with anything that involves big losses. I mean, they–what they usually try and do is get bond holders to make concessions or something. But I’ve not seen them wanting to sell the businesses at large losses. Now, you know, if they go into bankruptcy, then you buy them for the bankruptcy process. I mean, if the old TXU gets to 2,014 and they can’t meet the maturities that they have at that time or they haven’t done it earlier, you know, we may buy–we might think about buying the whole place, you know. But we’ll–we might buy it cheaper after a bond default than we would buy it from a private equity place.

KERNEN: Well, you know how to run utilities, and you might get the chance with, I forget how much is coming due.

BUFFETT: We might get the chance.

KERNEN: Yeah, 20 billion or something.

BUFFETT: Yeah, we might get the chance.

Health Insurance:

Unfortunately, I don’t see his ideas here happening. Although it is interesting to hear about how much Buffett and Munger admire Gawande, whose works are popular among value investors.

KERNEN: But you’re saying start over and do it on a bar–bipartisan basis is what you just said.

BUFFETT: I would–I would call in the smartest people in the health care field. I mean, you know, people like the fellow out of Kaiser Permanente or Mayos or this fellow the…

KERNEN: Mayo, Cleveland Clinic, Safeway…

BUFFETT: Or Gawande, the doctor–yeah, yeah. Cosgrove at…

KERNEN: Whole Foods.

BUFFETT: …Cleveland Clinic and…

KERNEN: There’s a bunch of smart–there’s a bunch of people that have some great private market–or free market ideas. And to do it…

BUFFETT: I’d lock them–I’d lock them in a room, Joe, and I’d tell them, you know, come out when you figure out how–some way to get this going in the other direction toward 13 or 14 percent. And it can be done. It can be done…

QUICK: Right. Warren, very quickly, so a viewer wrote in, Greg Robinson from Portland, Oregon, on this subject, said, “Wouldn’t a better fix for health care be a system similar to auto insurance? Could you give a specific–a simple scenario of how Geico would insure a large portion–population of people, perhaps having them pay a portion of the bill themselves so they will police the doctors? I’m a big believer in catastrophic care, but paying for your own maintenance.” Does that sound like a feasible idea?

BUFFETT: Yeah, it probably does. But the truth is, I would get people that know a lot more about it than I do. And, I mean, it–if you get the fellow that’s written on health care recently in the New Yorker, Gawande. I mean, he had–he had an article last summer that was absolutely magnificent (THE COST CONUNDRUM – Atul Gawande). My partner Charlie Munger sat down and wrote out a check for $20,000 to him and he’s never met him, never had any correspondence with it, he just mailed it to the New Yorker and he said, `This article is so useful socially.’ He says, `Just give this as a gift to the–to Dr. Gawande.’ It compared medical costs in McAllen, Texas, to El Paso, and it just showed how, with no better results, that in McAllen they were, you know, they were spending close to twice as much per person. And you have these enormous variances around the country. And, you know, if you had some really smart people running it that knew a lot about medicine, they’re going to–they could do a lot about it.

Using Stock as Currency:

I think this is a case where over simplification causes people to get the wrong idea. I believe that while Buffett was pretty opposed to issuing stock for deals, he can act rationally and do it when the terms make sense. In Kraft’s case, making sure you are not using stock that is greatly undervalued to purchase something that is less than a bargain– especially when you have to sell off key pieces of your business at ultra low prices, like the pizza business.

KERNEN: Welcome back to SQUAWK BOX. Still to come in the next hour, PepsiCo CEO Indra Nooyi, that’s coming up at 8:10. Let’s get back to Omaha, that’s where we find our very own Becky Quick with Warren Buffett. Beck, I was thinking about Matt Rose and Burlington and using stock and Warren with Kraft and Cadbury and I love to get him talking about that, to try to figure out why stock was a good idea for Burlington, that it wasn’t a good idea for Kraft and I love it when you say you don’t like that deal, even though you love management. Go into that again. What was the difference between Kraft using stock and you using stock, other than maybe valuation on the company being acquired?

BUFFETT: Yeah, well, we hate using stock. No question about it, Joe. And because we already owned some Burlington beforehand, it turned it we had to use about 30 percent stock and as I put in the annual report, even though the Burlington holders were getting $100 a share, we felt it cost us more than that because we thought our stock at the time we made the deal was somewhat underpriced. We’d have done all cash if I’d felt comfortable in terms of our balance sheet, using all cash. But I never want to put us in a position where we’ve–we’re stretched in the least. So to make the deal, I had to do it. And I came to the conclusion that using 30 percent stock, which was about 6 percent of all the shares we had outstanding, still left us with a deal that made sense. But if it had to have been all stock or 50 percent stock, we couldn’t have done it and if I’d had enough cash around to do it, so I could’ve done it all cash, I would’ve liked it better.

KERNEN: How about Kraft? You warming up to that finally? Or are you still–you still don’t like it. You don’t get to vote, I guess, do you?

BUFFETT: No, we didn’t get to vote. And it wasn’t just–it wasn’t just the stock that was being used, although that was a terrible currency to use, just as our own stock is a terrible currency to use. But it wasn’t just the stock, it was the price being paid and it was the fact that the pizza business was sold in a very tax inefficient manner to partly fund the purchase. And it just–in the end, I felt poor after the deal was made. But I, you know, I wish Irene the best on executing well on it and I hope it works out. We’ll be a lot better off financially if it does, but I wouldn’t have done it.

QUICK: Warren, that question that Joe raised is one that we got from a lot of viewers, too. In fact, Todd in Parker, Colorado, wrote in and said, “In your annual report, you say that you’ll consider issuing stock when we receive as much in intrinsic business value as we give up. When exchanging Berkshire shares for Burlington Northern, did Berkshire shareholders receive less, equal or more in intrinsic value?”

BUFFETT: Well, we felt, Charlie and I, felt that we received as much or a tiny bit more in intrinsic value as we gave up. But we factored into that some other things I mentioned in the annual report. Namely, that putting $22 billion of cash to work made good sense for us in this business and that the opportunities over the next 40 or 50 years to keep putting more and more cash at reasonable returns in, just like we do in our utility business, also was an attractive opportunity. We’re going to generate lots of cash over the years and we don’t always have great places to put that. This offers one vehicle where we can put it at decent rates of return. Not great rates of return, but decent rates of return.

Animal Spirits and Acquisitions:

QUINTANILLA: Warren, you go–we know this is–you’re passionate about this from the letter, you go into a long hypothetical about company A buying company B whose stock is undervalued. You say that CEOs long on confidence and short on smarts, wants to buy company B for the prestige and maybe the compensation. Is that a–is that a veiled slight at Rosenfeld?

BUFFETT: No, it’s 50 years of being in board rooms and just seeing what happens. And you know, Keynes talked about–probably the best–the best chapters written on investing were chapters eight and 20 in “The Intelligent Investor” for individual investing. The best chapter ever written in sort of describing how the world works in markets is chapter 12 of “The General Theory” written by Keynes and in it he talks about animal spirits and what causes people to do the deals and all of that. It’s a marvelous chapter. And I’m not sure that he had Kraft in mind, but he had a lot of the companies that I’ve experienced over the years in mind. It’s a very normal thing. I mean, you know, everything looks–everything looks rosy, you know, when you first are looking at a deal. You don’t see the downsides. You don’t see the execution problems, you don’t see the people who are going to leave. You don’t see–you don’t see all kinds of things. And I’m guilty of that, too, incidentally. I’ve made some dumb deals in my life and I’ll make some more dumb deals and animal spirits will enter into those dumb deals. I guarantee you that. I just try to keep them under control and if I don’t, I count on Charlie to keep me under control.

Debt Problems in the US

QUICK: All right. Let’s get to some more questions that came in from shareholders. There’s one guy’s–number 184 for the control room. This came from Scott Deller in New York. He says, “How much debt would sink the United States? If the answer’s unknown, isn’t it risky to race at top speed toward that line?” There were a lot of questions like this that came in.

BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, we are doing things that are causing the debt to rise at a very rapid rate, I mean, when you’re running, you know, a fiscal deficit like we are. As long as you issue debt in your own currency, debt doesn’t sink you. Now it–what it does is it destroys the value of money over time. So you can make–you can make it so that the person who lent you money, 10 years from now or 20 years from now gets back dollars that aren’t worth very much. But you can–as long as you’ve got a printing press, you can–you can issue any amount of debt in your own currency. It’s when the world says to you, `We don’t want debt in your currency any more, issue it in something that’s more solid,’ and that’s what they do–they’ve done to various developing countries. That’s what they used to do to South American countries and so on. And then the music stops. The IMF comes in and whatever they take. We have this great reputation for 200 years, and people will accept dollars for a long time. But if the printing presses would run at a sufficient rate, people after a while would say, `Wait a second. We’re going to get stuck.’ You know, it’s interesting, when we talk about what’s happened in the last year or two how the taxpayers paid for this or the taxpayers paid for that, taxpayer hasn’t paid for any of it. We haven’t raised taxes on anybody. What we’ve done is the lenders have paid for it. So it’s…

QUICK: Well don’t those–don’t those costs eventually get passed onto the consumer too, though?

BUFFETT: Not–the costs really get passed on–generally speaking, they get passed onto the saver. They just–inflation steals from savers, and inflation is the logical consequences of printing too much money.

QUICK: And seniors who are living on fixed incomes.

BUFFETT: Anybody that’s living on any kind of fixed income. I mean, you know…

QUICK: And small businesses that are maybe hoping to get a loan from a bank that can’t give it at this point.

BUFFETT: …anybody that has their money–anybody that has their money in a money market fund or anything like that, you know, if we issue enough–if we keep printing enough–if we keep a large enough fiscal deficits we will eventually print a lot of money and money will be worthless. And incidentally, if the United States runs up trillions and trillions and trillions of debt to the rest of the world, you know, I will guarantee you that the politicians of 10 or 20 years ago will not want to pay that back in hard money. It just doesn’t–it doesn’t make any sense.

The Financial Crisis in Greece
Buffett’s advocates swift action in dealing with the problem in Greece. I think that this is pretty appropriate. What we saw in the financial crisis here was that companies which did not deal with their problems fast enough wound up dead. When you are in a situation where you depend on borrowed money, you don’t have the luxury to sit and twiddle your thumbs. You’ve got to act before your credit lines dry up.

QUICK: When you look at the situation in Greece right now and what’s happening with the trouble they’ve gotten into, do you believe that contagion spreads to not only other EU nations, but potentially other states here in the United States? Is that a huge worry for you?

BUFFETT: There’s a huge incentive for the EU to handle something like Greece and, of course, that’s what you’re seeing now. I mean, it isn’t–it isn’t because the rest of–the other 15 countries in the EU have suddenly developed this great affinity for Greeks. They just–they know the consequences of, you know, if A is going to lead to B and you can’t stand B, solve A. And that is essentially the situation. That’s what we went through a year and a half ago, you know, after–when we stepped in and guaranteed money market funds and commercial paper and all of those things. We saw a run on the country developing, and, believe me, it was developing. And no one has to lend money to country A or country B or country C. And if they lose money with country A they’re going to get more worried about country B and country C just like the same experience we had with financial institutions in the fall of 2008. The time to stop runs is early on.

QUICK: But do you think that this is something that could happen here in the United States, if you look at California or New York, if you start looking at some of the states that have very large financial problems?

BUFFETT: Yeah, and they can’t print money.

QUICK: They can’t.

BUFFETT: No, no. What they can do is one of three things. They can cut expenses, they can raise income, or they can go to Washington eventually.

QUICK: And you think Washington would cover all of those problems?

BUFFETT: It would be very tough if you’re in Congress and they say, `Well, you bailed out General Motors, and you did this and that. And are you going to say, “People in the largest state in the union or whatever it is, that we’re not going to take care of you? I mean, the political problem would be huge. But there’s no question that states and municipalities the fiscal–the financial situation for them has deteriorated dramatically. We did not write any municipal insurance to speak of in 2009. The risk got higher and the premiums got lower and that just–it made it a dumb sort of thing to do in our view.

QUICK: Tying this back to Europe and if Europe and Germany do step in and provide for Greece, as it looks like they very–may very well do at this point…

BUFFETT: Almost have to, yeah.

QUICK: …does that make you think that all these hedge funds that are betting against the Euro are on the wrong side of this fence?

BUFFETT: Well, I don’t know what happens to the euro exactly, but I mean, there are–I’m sure there are hedge funds that are betting against the euro that are hoping that for one reason the Germans gets mad at the Greeks, or whatever it may be, you know, they are–let’s say there are two banks in town. You own a bank and I own a bank. Now, if I want to put you out of business what do I do? I go out and hire 50 bums on the street and get them to stand in line in front of your bank. You know, that’s all I have to do. You know, and those 50 will become 100. And after a while, I can let the 50 bums and go, and it will create its own dynamic. You do not want that to happen with countries. So you better stop it, you know, right off the bat. And everybody realizes that. The only question is whether it gets it gets bogged down in something or other.